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Growing evidence indicates that weak or misaligned incentives facing providers pose a sig-
nificant barrier to service delivery in many developing countries. To address weak supply-side in-
centives, performance pay and related approaches explicitly linking provider pay and performance
have become increasingly common in public service delivery. Despite the growing prominence of
these approaches, however, many conceptual issues surrounding the use of performance pay in
this context remain unexplored. A fundamental one is the role of performance pay for managers
in the organizations commonly tasked with delivering public services. Although a large litera-
ture examines performance pay for managers in private firms, much less is known about the use
of performance pay for their counterparts in public service organizations. Improving public ser-
vice delivery may nonetheless depend heavily on aligning the incentives of managers with social
objectives.
Drawing on a large-scale field experiment involving 300 primary schools in rural China, this
dissertation explores how performance incentives for school administrators a↵ect their implemen-
tation of new, school-based nutrition programs targeting anemia. School-based nutrition programs
are an important function of schools, particularly in settings with less developed public health in-
frastructures. Weak incentives for schools to e↵ectively implement these programs are compounded
as these programs compete with more traditional functions for finite school resources. I report the
results of this field experiment which was designed to test three main issues concerning the use of
performance incentives for school administrators in this context.
First, I study the e↵ect of o↵ering administrators performance pay contracts tied to re-
ductions in school-level anemia prevalence. As part of the experiment, a subset of schools were
randomly allocated to receive one of two levels of performance incentives for reductions in stu-
dent anemia or to a no-incentive comparison group. I find that large incentives led to meaningful
reductions while smaller incentives (10% of the size) were ine↵ective in reducing anemia. Fur-
ther, I find that an important channel through which large incentives impacted student nutrition
was by motivating administrators to engage households and influence feeding at home. I discuss
the implications of this finding for the design of performance incentives tied to jointly produced
outcomes.
Second, I study the impact of providing administrators with more resources to implement a
nutrition program and how this interacts with performance incentives. To test this, schools were
orthogonally assigned to two levels of block grants within each level of performance incentives. I
find that, absent explicit anemia-based incentives, increasing the size of block grants under the
control of administrators led to sizable reductions in anemia prevalence but were nearly twice
as costly as performance incentives. This impact was not purely the result of additional inputs;
larger block grants also caused a more e cient use of inputs and an increase in e↵ort devoted
to reducing anemia. I also find that additional resources and incentives are substitutes in this
context. I provide evidence that this substitution is due, at least in part, to incentives re-framing
the task of implementing the nutrition programs from one that was part of the professional role of
administrators to one that was not.
Finally, I approach the health promotion and education roles of schools as a multi-tasking
problem and use remaining experimental groups to examine how performance incentives for school
administrators to reduce anemia and improve test scores each a↵ect anemia prevalence and aca-
demic performance. Although the theory of multitasking is well-developed, there are few empirical
studies testing this theory directly. I emphasize three main findings. First, incentives in the two
dimensions (given in the context of an anemia reduction program) both led to significant reductions
in anemia prevalence. Second, anemia-based and test-based incentives serve as substitutes in the
direction of anemia reduction: providing administrators with both types of incentives did not lead
to significantly larger reductions in anemia. Third, I find that anemia incentives caused an alloca-
tion of resources away from education ’inputs’ but this did not lead to significantly lower student
performance on standardized exams after one year. These results reflect that test-based incentives
are well-aligned with improving nutrition, but anemia-based incentives are not well aligned with ef-
fort to improve academic performance. Strengthening incentives to improve academic performance
while also emphasizing the relationship between good nutrition and academic performance may
therefore be su cient to motivate administrators to e↵ectively implement school-based anemia
reduction programs while causing less reallocation of resources away from education.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Much research in development economics has concerned the question of how best to deliver
public services to the poor. Focusing on the provision of education and healthcare, this research has
considered how public services should be provided so to most cost-e↵ectively improve population
outcomes. A large portion of the research on this issue to date has focused on addressing the many
demand-side barriers that prevent individuals from investing in education or seeking healthcare
optimally. Equally daunting barriers, however, exist on the supply-side with providers. A growing
literature documents the poor provision of services in many developing countries (World Bank
2004; Banerjee et al. 2004; Das et al. 2008; Berendes et al. 2011; Sylvia et al 2013). Although
the underlying reasons are complex and incompletely understood, the culprit is not simply lack
of resources, inadequate training or deficiencies in provider knowledge. Supply-side incentives are
also often poorly aligned with social objectives.
Perhaps the most striking example is pervasive absenteeism among education and health
workers in many parts of the world (Chaudhury & Hammer 2003; Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo
(2004); Kremer et al. 2005; Chaudhury et al. 2006; Lewis 2006; Banerjee & Duflo 2006; Das,
Hammer and Leonard 2008; Berendes et al. 2011). When present, providers also often fail to
do what is within their knowledge and means. Several studies, for instance, have documented a
substantial “know-do gap” (or failure to do in practice what they know to do in principle) among
clinicians (Das and Hammer 2004; Alcazar et al. 2006; Chaudhury et al. 2006; Das & Hammer
2007; Leonard & Masatu 2010; Das et al. 2012). Educator and healthcare provider e↵ort may also
not be well-aligned with improving education and health outcomes. For example, inappropriate
incentive structures can lead healthcare providers to provide treatment that is unnecessary and
1
potentially harmful (the over-prescription of antibiotics in China in response to distroted drug
price schedules is a clear example – Currie et al. 2011, Yip et al. 2014).
To better align provider incentives with social objectives, “results-based financing” ap-
proaches have become increasingly common in public sector service delivery (Oxman & Fretheim
2008; Eichler & Levine 2009). Drawing on the logic of performance pay in human resource manage-
ment (Lazear 1995; Hall & Liebman 1998; Lazear 200), these approaches provide direct financial
rewards for achieving pre-specified performance targets.
While current evidence suggests that performance pay and related approaches hold promise
as a way to improve education and health outcomes, many conceptual issues about the appropriate
use of performance pay in public service delivery remain unexplored. A fundamental one is the role
of performance pay for managers in the organizations that most commonly deliver these services.
Although executive and managerial performance pay in the private sector is the subject of a large
literature, much less is known about performance pay for public-sector managers.1 Further, exist-
ing studies on performance pay in the public sector focus largely on incentives for front-line service
providers, including teachers and health workers (Rasul & Rogger 2013).2 Incentives for managers
have broader aims, however – including encouraging the desired allocation of resources under man-
agerial control (Holmstrom & Costa 1986). Although evidence on the incentives of public sector
managers is limited, private sector managers exert substantial influence on overall organizational
performance (Bloom et al. 2011; Bandiera et al. 2007). In public sector organizations, managerial
incentives may play a role in improving allocative e ciency within the organization and encourag-
ing innovation in service delivery.3 On the other hand, high-powered incentives may be ine↵ective
or lead to undesired consequences due to distinct features of public service (Dixit 2002).
1The literature on managerial incentives in the private sector includes, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990);
Hall and Liebman (1998); Hall and Murphy (2003); and Oyer and Shaefer (2005). See Murphy (1999) for a review
of CEO pay.
2Behrman et al. (2013) included rewards for school administrators. These rewards, however, were bundled with
a larger intervention that rewarded students and teachers as well and compared to student-only and teacher-only
interventions. This design precluded the isolation of the e↵ect of school administrator awards alone.
3Although I focus on delivery by the public sector, the complications of providing public services may have less
to do with the ownership of organizations that provide them and more to do with the nature of the services they
provide (Besley & Ghatak 2007; Dixit 2012). Services provided by public agencies are often complex and the goals
of organizations multi-faceted as a result (Dixit 2002). In addition, they are subject to well-known market failures
that lead to under-provision (in the health sector, for example, patients are unable to judge the quality of care
they recieve – Arrow 1963). Nevertheless, “remediable” ine ciencies (in the words of Williamson, 1996) may be
particularly pernicious in the public sector.
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In this dissertation, I study the role of managerial incentives in service delivery by analyzing
a large-scale policy experiment in rural China. My specific focus is school administrators during
the introduction of a new school-based nutrition program targeting iron deficiency, the most com-
mon micronutrient deficiency a↵ecting school-aged children in China (Press O ce of the Ministry
of Health 2012). Although school-based health and nutrition programs are an important function
of schools (particularly in developing countries) (Bundy and Guyatt, 1996; Jukes, Drake & Bundy,
2008; Orazem, Glewwe & Patrinos, 2008), weak incentives for schools to focus on health improve-
ment may limit the e↵ectiveness of these programs. Incentives facing educators in developing
countries are often weak in general (cf.World Bank 2004; Duflo & Hanna 2005; Chaudhury et al.,
2006; Banerjee & Duflo 2006). Further, even motivated educators may focus on traditional respon-
sibilities over health promotion. Although health promotion and education may be complementary
functions, they compete for finite school resources. Poor educator incentives for improving health
may therefore reduce the ability of school-based health and nutrition interventions to improve
student health outcomes through reduced compliance or diversion of resources to more traditional
functions.
This context provides an interesting case study of managerial incentives for several reasons.
First, schools in rural China—and primary school administrators (principals), in particular—are
legally responsible for the wellbeing of their students (Anonymous 1995). Second, school adminis-
trators are often given a good deal of de facto discretion in their management of the school, though
this varies to some degree by locality. Third, school-based health programs are a prime example
of the most common type of change among public agencies—the addition of new programs on top
of existing responsibilities, scenarios in which managerial incentives are central to success (Wilson
1989). Wilson (1989) and others emphasize that public sector agencies tend to resist new tasks if
they do not fit well into the organization’s self-defined mission (Wilson 1989; Dixit 2002). In this
case, school administrators may resist a new program to reduce anemia if they do not view it as
complementary to their core responsibility of educating students.
Within this context, I study several features of performance incentives for school adminis-
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trators. First, I study the impact of administrator performance incentives tied to student nutrition,
rewarding administrators based on school level changes in the rate of anemic students over the
school year. I evaluate impacts on how the school-based anemia reduction program was imple-
mented and on anemia prevalence. I also study how the e↵ectiveness of this performance incentive
varies with the size (or strength of the incentive). Specifically, I compare small incentives with
large incentives ten times the strength. Previous studies from a variety of contexts have shown
small incentives or prices leading to large changes in behavior (Kremer & Miguel 2007; Thornton
2008; Banerjee et al. 2010; Cohen & Dupas 2010; Karlan et al. 2011; Duflo et al. 2011). The
findings in these studies suggest that the existence of incentives or a price may be more important
than the actual level of incentives. My aim is to test this directly in the context of performance
incentives.
Second, because an important distinction between managers and front-line workers is the
control they exert over use of an organization’s resources (and it is common for performance pay
programs to be introduced in conjunction with increases in resources or training - Oxman 2008), I
study how the responses of managers to performance incentives vary with budget size.4 Specifically,
I test whether performance incentives and the amount of resources under control of administrators
are complements or substitutes. Complementarity is possible for intuitive reasons. For example,
managers may wish to respond to performance incentives, but resource (or decision-making) con-
straints hinder their ability to do so, limiting the circumstances under which performance pay will
be e↵ective. There are also theoretical rationales for substitution, however. One possibility, for
instance, is that if the marginal return to managerial e↵ort declines with resources allocated to
a task (and e↵ort is costly), managers with larger budgets may simply substitute organizational
resources for their e↵ort in the production of contracted outcomes. How incentives and budgetary
resources interact may also be less clear if a larger budget (and more discretion over the use of
funds) itself has a motivational e↵ect on school administrators. The public administration litera-
ture emphasizes this possiblity if an increase in the amount of resources under the control of school
4This section and the first include material from joint work with Renfu Luo, Grant Miller, Scott Rozelle and
Marcos Vera-Hernandez.
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administrators is also seen as an increase in autonomy (Rose-Ackerman 1986; Perry & Wise 1990).
Third, I approach these two roles of schools as a multi-tasking problem and examine how
provider (school administrator) incentives to reduce anemia and improve test scores each a↵ect
anemia prevalence and academic performance. Further, I test whether these two incentives are
complements or substitutes. Although the theory of multitasking (following from the work of
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) is well developed, there are few empirical studies testing this theory
directly. Further, existing studies focus on multitasking in the context of rewarding an imperfect
measure of an unobservable outcome that is of ultimate value to a principal (for example, rewarding
quantity when quality is also valued - Hong et al. 2013). In this study, I abstract from the issue
of observability and focus on the e↵ects of incentives for outcomes (potentially) requiring di↵erent
inputs. Specifically, I aim to test how strengthening incentives in one direction a↵ects the incented
outcome as well as a second outcome that is also valued. I also ask whether there is a benefit in
terms of either outcome gained by attempting to deal with multitasking by strengthening incentives
in both directions simultaneously. School-based nutrition programs provide an ideal setting for
these tests as improving nutrition and academic outcomes are not completely orthogonal (as is
generally the case for tasks assigned to a single organization or agency). Further, the relationship
between the two roles is asymetric (nutrition is an input to academic performance but academic
performance is not an input to nutrition) which allows me to examine how incentives a↵ect more or
less well-aligned outcomes. The issues addressed here have important implications for the deisgn
of performance incentive schemes for health delivery, in particular, given that these often base
rewards on multiple outcome measures produced by more or less complementary inputs (Sherry,
Bauho↵ and Mohanan 2013).
By focusing on school managers (administrators), this dissertation contributes to a small but
growing literature on the use of performance pay in the delivery of public services in developing
countries. Several recent studies have examined the e↵ects of performance pay structured as
personal income for front line providers of health and education services (Lavy 2002; Lavy 2009;
Glewwe et al. 2010; Singh 2011; Muralidharan & Sundararaman 2011; Duflo et al. 2012; Ashraf,
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Bandiera and Jack 2013; Behrman et al. 2013). While the e↵ort of front line workers may
ultimately have a significant influence on overall organizational e ciency, they generally have
limited control over organizational resources (including the e↵ort of others in the organization).
Their ability to fully respond to outcome based incentives may therefore also be limited since they
are less able to draw on specific knowledge and innovate in service delivery. On the other hand,
performance incentives at the institutional level (for NGOs or local governments, for example) are
more likely to influence resource allocation and improve allocative e ciency. Such institutional
level incentives have also been studied in a number of contexts (Basinga et al. 2011; Gertler and
Vermeersch 2012; Olken, Onishi and Wang 2012; Yip et al. 2014). Compared to individuals,
organizations may also be less subject to behavior pitfalls commonly referenced in the literature
on performance incentives (namely that extrinsic rewards can crowd out intrinsic motivation –
Frey and Jegen 2001, Gneezy et al. 2011, Kamenca 2012). Performance incentives targeting
organizations, however, are commonly structured as potential increases in budget revenue and it
is unclear to what degree this motivates individuals within organizations (and how). Incentives
for managers (in the hierarchical organizations that most commonly provide public services in
developing countries - WDR 2004) may be an important middle ground.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews the recent
literature on incentives in public service delivery. Chapter 3 provides more background information
on iron deficiency and its prevalence in China. Chapter 4 discusses the conceptual framework and
research questions in more detail. Chapter 5 presents the experimental design, data collection and
empirical approach. Chapters 6 presents the experimental results. The final chapter concludes.
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Chapter 2: Performance Pay and Managers in Public Service Delivery
Eichler (2006) defines pay-for-performance as “a transfer of money or material goods con-
ditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target.” 1 The
intuition underlying performance pay and related approaches is the hidden action principal-agent
problem in which a principal wishes to better align the incentives facing an agent with her own
utility function. Performance pay approaches attempt to accomplish this by providing rewards
(contracts) based on some performance measure thought to reflect e↵ort that is valuable to the
principal. Such performance incentive contracts have, of course, long been used to solve hidden
action principal-agent problems in a wide range of contexts. Examples in private firms include
sales commissions or CEO pay tied to firm value (see Lazear 1995; Hall & Liebman 1998; Lazear
2000).
Amid evidence of weak and misaligned incentives among those providing public services,
performance pay approaches have become an increasingly common feature of service provision
in wealthy and developing countries alike.2 In 2011, 28 of the 34 OECD countries had intro-
duced some from of performance pay in the public sector (Hasnain, Manning and Pierskalla 2014).
Prominent examples in wealthy countries include the British National Health Services quality and
outcomes framework and the introduction of teacher performance pay in a number of states in the
U.S.. Performance pay is also becoming more prominent in developing countries. A number of
international aid organizations, for example, have introduced performance pay under the umbrella
of “results-based financing.” Governments are also increasingly experimenting with performance
1Several terms are used in the literature for performance incentive contracts including performance pay, pay-for-
performance, results-based financing, performance-based funding and output-based aid.
2On one level, performance pay is no di↵erent than user fees. The distinction is that government funding of public
services is traditionally through set operating budgets allocated by higher levels. These are commonly based on
volume of services that are provided by an organization (i.e. capitation) and not related to performance measures.
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pay approaches. Rwanda, beginning in 2005, began to implement a national P4P scheme that
supplemented health centers’ input based budgets with payments tied to 14 maternal and child
healthcare output indicators (Basinga et al. 2011). In 2009, China introduced a new ’Teacher Per-
formance Pay Policy’, stipulating that a portion of teacher pay increases be tied to performance
evaluations.
Despite increasing interest among policy makers in using performance pay as a way of
improving public sector productivity, empirical evidence on the e↵ectiveness of performance pay
approaches in the delivery of public services remains limited. A recent Cochorane report on pay for
performance in developing country health delivery, for instance, concluded that evidence was too
week to draw conclusions (Witter et al. 2012). Although evidence is growing, additional evidence is
needed as these approaches are increasingly adopted. Evidence from public service organizations
is particularly important given often-voiced concerns about the use of high-powered incentives
in the public sector (Muralidharan 2012). These concerns include, for example, the di culty of
appropriately designing rewards given the complex nature of services provided by public service
organizations and lack of clearly defined goals (specifically in the presence of multitasking and
multiple principals – Dixit 2002) and the potential for extrinsic incentives to crowd out intrinsic
motivation or degrade professional norms (Frey and Jegen 2001; Leonard and Masatu 2010).
This chapter outlines some of the recent evidence on the use of performance pay in education
and health sectors in developing countries. The design of performance pay schemes varies signifi-
cantly in in a number of dimensions. In my discussion, I focus on the dimension of who is rewarded
as this is most illustrative of the potential role of incentives for managers. In general, studies to
date have focused on either incentives for front line workers or incentives for organizations. The
final section discusses some relevant evidence on managers and their incentives.
2.1 Rewarding Individuals
Studies of incentives as personal income to provide public services in developing countries
have focused on front line sta↵ such as teachers and health workers. Teacher performance pay,
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for instance, has now been studied in a number of developing countries (Lavy 2002; Lavy 2009;
Glewwe et al. 2010; Muralidharan & Sundararaman 2011; Duflo et al. 2012; Behrman et al.
2013). Some of the best recent evidence on teacher incentives in developing countries comes from
a recent large-scale randomized trial among primary school teachers in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). After 2 years of the program, incentives led to
achievement gains of 0.27 standard deviations in math and 0.17 standard deviations in language.
After five years, students who attended all five years of primary school under the teacher incentive
program scored 0.54 standard deviations higher in math and 0.35 standard deviation higher on
language tests compared to students in control schools. Students also scored significantly higher
on subjects that were not incentivized under the program. Further, the authors test extensively
for perverse outcomes such as “teaching to the test”, reduced attention to non-incentivize subjects
and teachers attempting to game the contract and find no evidence that any of this occurred.
Other studies of teacher incentives, however, have shown more mixed results. Reporting
the results of a randomized trial in Kenya that provided group incentives to teachers based on
test scores, Glewwe et al. (2010) found that, although test scores increased in the short run in
incentive schools by 0.14 standard deviations, these gains faded after the program ended. Further,
they find that, while there was no e↵ect on teacher attendance or homework assignment, there
was an increase in test preparation sessions. They interpret these results as evidence that teachers
increased e↵ort on test preparation in incentivized subjects but not on e↵ort that contributed to
longer term learning. In a more recent experiment in Mexican high schools, Behrman et al. (2013)
find no impact of incentives for mathematics teachers.
Singh (2011) and Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack (2013) provide sobering results for rewarding
individuals to provide health services in developing countries. Singh (2011) studies rewards for
Indian day care workers tied to reductions in malnutrition. Performance incentives for day care
workers alone were ine↵ective, but combining incentives with nutrition information to mothers led
to a decline in malnutrition of 4.2% after three months. Ashraf, Bandiera and Jack (2013) find
that financial incentives for hairdressers and barbers in Zambia to sell condoms in their shops was
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ine↵ective. Non-financial incentives that provided social recognition, however, led to significant
gains in condom sales.
2.2 Rewarding Organizations
While the e↵ort of front line workers may ultimately have a significant influence on overall
organizational e ciency, they generally have limited control over organizational resources (includ-
ing the e↵ort of others in the organization). Their ability to fully respond to outcome based
incentives may therefore also be limited since they are less able to draw on specific knowledge and
innovate in service delivery (one of the main arguments of performance pay proponents). On the
other hand, performance incentives at the institutional level (for NGOs or local governments, for
example) are more likely to influence resource allocation and improve allocative e ciency.
Such institutional level incentives have also now been studied in a number of contexts
(Basinga et al. 2011; Gertler and Vermeersch 2012; Olken, Onishi and Wang 2012; Yip et al. 2014).
For the most part, these studies have focused on organizations providing health services. 3 Basinga
et al (2011) and Gertler and Vermeerch (2012) evaluate the National P4P scheme in Rwanda
which supplemented health centers’ input based budgets with payments tied to 14 maternal and
child healthcare output indicators. Using a randomized roll-out among a group of 166 health
care facilities, these studies find that the program significantly increased a number of incentivized
measures including institutional deliveries and preventative health service use by children under
59 months. The program also had a large e↵ect on the weight-for-age of children 0-11 months
and height-for-age among children 24-49 months and significantly reduced the “know-do” gap (the
di↵erence between what providers know to do and what they do in practice). The researchers also
find evidence of strong complementarity between performance incentives and provider skill.
Olken, Onishi and Wong (2012) study a program in Indonesia that included incentives for
local governments to provide health and education services. Under the program, villages were
given block grants to provide schooling and maternal and child health services. In a randomly
3For reviews of the use of performance pay in health, see Eldridge and Palmer 2009, Witter et al. 2012, and
Miller & Babiarz 2013.
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chosen subset of villages, subsequent year block grants were tied to performance on 12 maternal
and child health and education indicators relative to other villages in their region. Incentives led
to better performance on health indicators but had no impact on education. The authors estimate
that 50-75% of the total impact of block grants on health indicators was attributable to incentives.
Yip et al. (2014) conducted a randomized evaluation of pay-for-performance with capita-
tion grants (against the status quo of fee-for-service) for rural township health centers and their
subordinate village clinics in Ningxia, a relatively poor province in northwest China. Under the
intervention, funding for township health centers was switched from a fee-for service basis to a
capitation grant. At the beginning of the year, treatment townships received 70% of this grant.
The remaining budget was then dispersed based on performance assessments tied to antibiotic
prescription rates and patient satisfaction (and were subject to a quantity threshold). The authors
found that pay-for-performance with capitation led to a 15% drop in rates of antibiotic prescrip-
tion but found no impact on other outcomes (patient satisfaction, volume of outpatient visits and
health spending).
Compared to individuals, organizations may also be less subject to behavior pitfalls com-
monly referenced in the literature on performance incentives (namely that extrinsic rewards can
crowd out intrinsic motivation – Frey and Jegen 2001, Gneezy et al. 2011, Kamenca 2012). Perfor-
mance incentives targeting organizations, however, are commonly structured as potential increases
in budget revenue and it is unclear to what degree this motivates individuals within organizations
(and how). Organizations still need to solve internal principal agent problems with front line work-
ers. For instance, the contracts for health centers in Rwanda studied in Basinga et al. (2011) and
Gertler and Vermeersch (2012) paid facilities, not individuals, based on the provision of a basket of
services, however facilities could use the p4p funds at their discretion and more than 77% was used
for sta↵ compensation. Of course, incentives could be structured as personal pay tied to aggregate
performance. For lower-level workers, however, such a reward structure could create incentives for
free riding (Holmstrom 1982). Consistent with this, Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2011) find
that group incentives for teachers consistently under perform individual incentives.
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2.3 Managers
Incentives for managers (in the hierarchical organizations that most commonly provide pub-
lic services in developing countries - WDR 2004) may functionally be an important middle ground
between incentives for front line workers and organizations as a whole. The role of performance
incentives for managers in the public sector, in both wealthy and developing countries, has not been
well studied, however. Although executive and managerial performance pay in the private sector
is the subject of a large literature4, much less is known about performance pay for public-sector
managers.
There is some evidence on the correlation between incentives and performance for public
sector managers from two recent observational studies. Binderkrantz and Christiansen (2012)
study performance pay reform in Denmark that included financial rewards in executive contracts
tied to achievement of performance targets. Using data on 124 agency heads, they find little
correlation between bonus payments and performance indicators. Rasul & Rogger (2013) study
incentives for bureaucrats in the Nigerian Civil Service using a unique dataset on 4700 projects
across 63 civil service organizations responsible for these projects. They estimate that a one
standard deviation increase in performance incentives is correlated with a 14% drop in project
completion rates. Further, this negative correlation is strongest for more complex projects and
projects that organizations implement less frequently. Importantly, Rasul & Roger (2013) also
document that a one standard deviation increase in autonomy corresponds to an 18% increase in
project completion among Nigerian Bureaucrats and that autonomy and performance incentives
are complementary.
Additional rationale for rewarding managers is that they can exert substantial influence on
overall organizational performance. Through an experiment in Indian textile firms, for instance,
Bloom et al. (2011) find that a management intervention raised productivity by 18%. McKenzie
4The literature on managerial incentives in the private sector includes, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990);
Hall and Liebman (1998); Hall and Murphy (2003); and Oyer and Shaefer (2005). See Murphy (1999) for a review
of CEO pay. For reviews see (Gibbs; Canice Prendergast 1999; R. Gibbons 1998; Murphy 1999; Bloom and Van
Reenen 2011).
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& Woodru↵ (2014) review similar management interventions in private firms and paint a more
modest picture of these interventions, however.
The quality of school managers (principals), specifically, has long been recognized as an im-
portant factor a↵ecting school function anecdotally (Darling-Hammond et al. 2007) and has more
recently been empirically tied to student outcomes in developed countries (Branch, Hanushek, and
Rivkin 2012). Research has suggested that school managers’ management skills, influence on or-
ganizational identity, and role in motivating teachers and students all have important implications
for school function (Horng, Klasik, and Loeb 2010).
In one recent study, Branch et al. (2012) use value added approaches typically applied to
teacher e↵ectiveness studies to investigate the impact of individual school managers on student
outcomes. Their estimates suggest a large amount of variation in principal quality and their lower
bound (most conservative) estimate suggests that 1 standard deviation increase in manager quality
is associated with a 0.05 standard deviation increase in student performance on standardized exams
for all students in the school annually. Their results further suggest that one important way
through which managers influence school quality is through their influence on existing teachers
and on selection of teachers and teacher turnover. This finding has been echoed in other studies
on the roles of school management (Boyd et al. 2011).
If, as in developed countries, there is significant variation in school manager quality and this
is associated with student outcomes in developing countries as well, this suggests that incentives
for school managers in developing country school systems may hold promise as an e↵ective way of
improving school system performance and student outcomes.
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Chapter 3: Anemia in Rural China: Causes, Consequences, Prevalence and Inter-
ventions
The context of this study is school-based programs to reduce iron deficiency anemia in rural
Western China. In this chapter, I provide background on the causes and consequences of anemia,
the prevalence of anemia in western China and known e↵ective strategies to address iron deficiency.
3.1 Causes and Consequences of Anemia and Iron Deficiency
Anemia is estimated to a↵ect nearly one quarter of all school-aged children (World Health
Organization 2001). While there are many causes of anemia (including a variety of genetic dis-
orders, nutritional deficiencies and infections), iron deficiency accounts for around 50% of cases
globally (World Health Organization 2001; Balarajan et al. 2011; Pasricha et al. 2013).1 In
China, studies have shown that 85-95% of anemia is due to iron deficiency (Du et al. 2000). Iron
deficiency anemia (IDA), however, is a severe form of iron deficiency; iron deficiency also exists
without anemia and can be 2 to 3 times more prevalent in a population than IDA (Yip 2001).2 In
China, as in many developing countries, the main cause of iron deficiency is low bioavailability of
dietary iron (Du et al. 2000).
The consequences of iron deficiency—with or without anemia—can be substantial, partic-
ularly for children during critical developmental periods. A large body of literature links iron
deficiency to fatigue and reduced work capacity among adolescents and adults, impaired cogni-
1There is some debate in the public health literature on the proportion of the anemia burden attributable to iron
deficiency (Balarajan et al. 2011). Intestinal worms are unlikely to be a major cause of anemia in our study areas
as the prevalence of hookworm (the parasite most commonly associated with anemia) is low (Xu et al. 1995).
2Due to the cost of assessing iron deficiency directly in surveys, anemia prevalence is often used as an indicator
for the amount of iron deficiency in a population though it lacks specificity to establish iron status (Balarajan et
al. 2011). Anemia is defined based on established cuto↵s in hemoglobin concentration, which can be cheaply and
reliably assessed in the field (World Health Organization 2001; Balarajan et al. 2011).
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tion and cognitive development among children and reduced immune response for all age groups
(Thomas et al. 2006; Yip 2001; World Health Organization 2001; Balarajan et al. 2011). More
recently, iron deficiency has also been linked to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Konofal,
Lecendreux, Deron, Marchand, Cortese, Zaim et al., 2008). Likely a result of these e↵ects on
cognition and behavior, iron deficient school-aged children have also been shown to have inferior
educational outcomes, including grades, attendance and attainment (Taras, 2005; Nokes, van den
Bosch & Bundy, 1998). One available estimate of the economic burden of iron deficiency – taking
into account lost physical productivity among adults and cognitive e↵ects among children – calcu-
lates the median present value of losses in a selected group of 10 developing countries to be 25.60
per capita (Horton and Ross 2003).3
3.2 Anemia Prevalence in Western China
This study took place in primary schools across nationally-designated poor counties in three
provinces of western China (see Figure 1).4 Despite rapid economic development and rising incomes
in recent years, anemia rates among school-aged children in rural China remain stubbornly high.
Approximately one third of children in nationally-designated poverty counties of Northwest China
between ages 8 and 12 are anemic (Luo, Wang, Zhang, Liu, Shi, Miller et al., 2011b; Luo, Kleiman-
Weiner, Rozelle, Zhang, Liu, Sharbano et al., 2010). 56As in China generally, anemia in this region
is largely due to iron deficiency: diets contain insu cient sources of iron (such as meats and green
vegetables), as well as vitamin C which promotes iron absorption. 7
3In 2012 dollars, converted from 16.78 in 1994 dollars as reported in the study.
4The Chinese government designates a list of “poverty” counties, which it uses to target poverty-
alleviation funds. The current list, released in 2012, includes 592 of China’s 2,862 county-level divisions.
(http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/701105/Chinas-poorest-counties-named.aspx, accessed Sep. 11,
2013).
5At altitudes above 1000 meters, it is necessary to adjust hemoglobin concentration when assessing anemia status
as the distribution in normal populations increases in response to lower partial pressure of oxygen and reduced blood
oxygen saturation (Nestel 2002). To adjust measured hemoglobin, we use the following formula developed by the
US CDC: Hbadjusted = Hbmeasured + 0.32 ⇤ (Altitude(m) ⇤ 0.0033)  0.22 ⇤ (Altitude ⇤ 0.003)2.
6Even children with Hb concentration above 120 g/L can be considered at risk of anemia given significant
variability in hemoglobin values over time. In particular, there is a significant amount of seasonal variation in
hemoglobin measurements, possibly due to seasonal availability of agricultural products.
7Helminth infections are unlikely to be a major cause of anemia in our study areas as the prevalence of hookworm
(the parasite most commonly associated with anemia) is low (Xu et al. 1995).
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Guizhou 2010 437 18.7
Shaanxi 2009 2095 127.1 11.3 26.2
Gansu 2010 1630 129.3 12.2 20.6
Ningxia 2010 1016 132.6 12.0 14.1
Table 3.1: Previous Surveys of Anemia Rates in Western China. Data Source: Surveys by the
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) and the Northwest Socioeconomic Development
Research Center (NSDRC). Anemic defined as Hb <120 g/L.
3.3 Biomedical Interventions
Iron deficiency can be e↵ectively prevented and treated through interventions using vari-
ous strategies to deliver iron, which—if e↵ectively implemented—can be extremely cost-e↵ective
(Balarajan et al. 2011; Horton & Ross 2003). Iron repletion can improve – and possibly reverse
– the detrimental e↵ects of anemia. Improvements in language and motor development have been
observed among pre-school age children in East Africa following increased levels of iron (Stoltzfus,
Kvalsvig, Chwaya, Montresor, Albonico, Tielsch, et al., 2001). In a meta-analysis of randomized
controlled trials that provided iron supplements, Sachdev, Gera & Nestel (2005) find that iron
supplements significantly improved the performance of children on tests of cognitive development,
especially among children who were initially anemic.
Worldwide, the predominant approach to deliver iron is to fortify dietary staples. Histor-
ically, fortifying staples has proven an e↵ective means to address population-level micronutrient
deficiencies worldwide (Allen et al. 2006). An attractive feature of this approach is that it largely
does not require change in behavior and can be implemented on a large scale. Although staples,
such as flour and soy sauce, can be fortified with iron, this may be ine↵ective in areas (such as
Northwest China) where households grow and consume their own food (Allen et al. 2006). Fur-
ther, in contrast to the success of fortification in addressing other micronutrient deficiencies, such
as in iodine and Vitamin A, evidence that fortification can similarly address iron deficiency at the
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population level is more limited (Uauy, Hertrampf, and Reddy 2002).
An alternative set of strategies focuses on increasing dietary intake of iron. This can be
accomplished by encouraging both increased consumption of iron-rich foods and the appropriate
mix of other foods that can a↵ect iron absorption. The type of dietary iron most easily absorbed
(called heme iron) is found in animal sources (red meats, fish and poultry). Plant food sources
(green vegetables, etc) provide a less easily-absorbed type of iron, non-heme iron. The absorption
of non-heme iron can be improved, however, by increasing consumption of fruits and vegetables
containing vitamin C and reducing consumption of foods that inhibit absorption (such as milk and
other calcium-rich products). 8As noted, the major cause of iron deficiency in China appears to be
low dietary iron bioavailability: a significant amount of iron is consumed from plant sources, but
this is not easily absorbed and consumption of meats is low, particularly in poor areas of western
China (Du et al. 2000). Although encouraging dietary change may be desirable as a long-run
solution to iron deficiency, changing dietary behavior through policy interventions is relatively
di cult.
Finally, micronutrient supplements (or vitamins) containing iron can be provided at the
individual level. Indeed, previous research in China found that providing daily supplements con-
taining iron to children in rural primary schools over five months reduced anemia rates by 10
percentage points (Luo et al. 2012). To be e↵ective, however, regular consumption over time is
necessary. Consequently, compliance may be inadequate due to the need for sustained e↵ort. 9
Although iron deficiency is straightforward and inexpensive to treat in technical terms,
approaches that rely on behavior change (i.e., strategies other than centralized fortification of
dietary staples—which often do not reach many of the poorest households who grow their own
food) face substantial challenges. Individuals and households must choose to consume iron rich
foods and/or supplements, and organizations—particularly the public sector—must successfully
8Initial stores of iron in the body can also a↵ect absorption of dietary iron (Finch 1994). Because there is an
optimal level of iron, the body increases absorption when iron stores are low and decreases absorption when initial
stores are high. The returns to a given amount of iron are therefore decreasing in initial iron stores.
9Previous trials addressing iron deficiency and anemia have su↵ered from low levels of compliance or attempted
to preempt compliance problems. Bobonis et al. 2006, for example, instructed preschool teachers to provide children
with iron therapy for 30 days following health camps but found that only around 18 days were actually administered.
The WISE study in Indonesia (Thomas et al 2006) hired facilitators to regularly visit participants and remind them
to take their supplements.
17
deliver them. In the case of schools, administrators must take actions to ensure that their school-
based anemia reduction programs are implemented e↵ectively (i.e., taking actions to ensure that
children consume supplements or work to improve the diets of children at school and home). Even
distributing micronutrient supplements requires e↵ort: water needs to be boiled and cooled, it
reduces instruction time and many students do not like taking them and need to be supervised by
teachers.
3.4 Addressing Anemia Through School-based Programs
School-based interventions are believed to be among the most cost-e↵ective approaches
for delivering health and nutrition services to children in developing countries (Bundy & Guyatt
1996; Jukes et al. 2007; Orazem et al. 2008). Indeed, the 2008 Copenhagen Consensus ranked
school nutrition programs among the top ten solutions to address global challenges based on cost-
e↵ectiveness.10 Because developing-country school systems tend to be more developed than public
health systems and schools are natural points of contact with school-aged children, school systems
provide a platform from which health and nutrition interventions can be delivered at relatively low
cost (Bundy & Guyatt 1996; Bundy et al. 2006; Jukes et al. 2007). School-based approaches may
be particularly e↵ective in countries such as China where school attendance at the primary school
level is nearly universal.
Despite evidence of their e↵ectiveness, however, weak incentives for educators to improve
health may keep school-based health and nutrition programs from reaching their full potential.
Incentives facing educators in developing countries are often weak in general (cf. World Bank,
2004; Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidaran & Rogers, 2006; Banerjee & Duflo 2006; Duflo
& Hanna 2005). Further, even motivated educators may focus on traditional responsibilities over
health promotion. Although health promotion and education may be complementary functions,
they compete for the attention of finite school resources. Poor educator incentives for improving
health may therefore reduce the ability of school-based health interventions to improve student
10Copenhagen Consensus 2008 results. http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/projects/copenhagen-consensus-
2008/outcome (Accessed Sep. 11, 2013). Nearly every country in the world seeks to feed at least some of its students
through school-based programs (Alderman & Bundy 2011).
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health outcomes through reduced compliance or diversion of resources to more traditional functions.
In addition to factors a↵ecting delivery on the part of schools (the supply side), household
responses to school-based nutrition programs could also limit their e↵ectiveness. Recent studies
have highlighted the potential for education and health inputs provided by schools to crowd-
out household investments (Jacoby 2002; Das et al. 2013). However, as discussed in the previous
chapter, (outcome-based) supply-side incentives could potentially counteract this e↵ect if incentives
encourage more engagement with households with the goals of increasing investments education
and nutrition at home.
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Chapter 4: Conceptual Framework and Research Questions
In this dissertation, I aim to address three main questions about the use of performance
pay for school administrators in the context of school-based nutrition programs. First, I study the
impact of administrator incentives tied to student nutrition, rewarding administrators based on
school level changes in the rate of anemic students over the school year. Second, I study how the
responses of managers to performance incentives vary with budget size. Finally, I examine how
performance incentives for school administrators to a.) reduce anemia, c.) improve test scores,
or c.) both each a↵ect anemia prevalence and academic performance. In this chapter I discuss
conceptual issues related to these three main questions.
4.1 Incentives for School Managers
A newly introduced school-based nutrition program is a prime example of what is, according
to Wilson (1989), the most common type of change in government agencies: a new program or
task that is added on to existing organizational functions. In the current context, administrators
may resist devoting resources to implementing a new nutrition program for reasons beyond mere
disutility of e↵ort on the part of administrators. First, implementing a new program may detract
organizational e↵ort (of administrators themselves and workers under their direction) away from
other school functions. Second, even if additional funds are available, money is fungible and there is
an opportunity cost of allocating funds to a nutrition program rather than other uses (particularly
when monitoring is di cult).
Managerial incentives (for school administrators) may be particularly salient in this context.
Unlike incentives for front line workers (the main purpose of which is to elicit e↵ort in line with
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the incentivized task), managerial incentives tied to project-specific outputs can also encourage
the allocation of resources (funds, e↵ort of subordinates, etc) under their control. Holmstrom
and Costa (1986), for example, present a model that highlights the role of managerial decisions
regarding project investments and how career concerns of managers can cause misalignment with
the objectives of superiors. Thus, providing school administrators with incentives tied to student
nutrition may help overcome countervailing incentives and encourage “investment” in the nutrition
program.
An important feature of the incentives studied here is that they are based on an output
(student anemia prevalence). In contrast to rewarding input use (use of pre-specified health tech-
nologies for example), rewarding outputs directly–without specifying the precise inputs to use or
strategies to deliver them–strengthens the incentives of managers to use specific knowledge (knowl-
edge of local context and appropriate selections of ’inputs’). Output or outcome-based incentives
are therefore, in theory, complementary with managers’ control over resources. The degree to which
the focus of incentives on outcomes (or on managers vs. front line sta↵) is beneficial depends on
whether this specific knowledge is valuable information in the production of target outcomes. Al-
though outcome based contracts are the norm in education (e.g. teacher incentives tied to student
achievement), they tend to be less common in health (Miller & Babiarz 2013).1
Another relevant feature of the incentives I study is that they are not only outcome-based,
but based on outcomes that are jointly produced (with teachers and other school sta↵, children, and
households). This has two main implications in the context of incentives for school administrators
to reduce anemia and raise test scores. First, rewards based on these outcomes will strengthen
incentives for administrators to encourage others to contribute to the jointly produced outcome
(e↵ectively to bring in extra-marginal resources). Second, an increase in e↵ort on the part of
administrators may cause others to reduce theirs (Holmstrom 1982). Such an e↵ect is of particular
concern in the context of school-based programs as households could reduce their investment in
their children’s nutrition or education in response to school-based inputs (Das et al 2011, Jacoby
1Leonard (2003) provides examples of traditional healers o↵ering payment contracts contingent on health out-
comes in Cameroon.
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2002). This could dampen the e↵ects of incentives if administrators believe they will not be
rewarded due to o↵setting reductions in inputs at home (Leonard 2003). On the other hand,
administrators are incentivized to prevent this and may use their specific knowledge to do so.
4.1.1 Why Performance Incentives Might Not “Perform”
In the last decade, several studies the have shown that incentives can be ine↵ective or
even backfire for psychological reasons (see recent surveys by Gneezy et al 2011 and Kamenica
2012). One common argument against performance pay in public sector organizations is that
individuals in the public sector tend to be more motivated by internal factors (intrinsic, pro-social
and public service motivation). If external incentives crowd out or are substitutes to internal
motives, they could be ine↵ective or have unintended consequences (Langbein 2010; Rebitzer and
Taylor 2011; Frey and Jegen 2001; Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008; Benabou and Tirole 2003;
Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). For instance, Benabou and Tirole (2003) note that incentives
can be detrimental if they signal that a task is di cult.
Performance incentives may also be ine↵ective for more mundane reasons such as simply
not being strong enough to counter existing institutional incentives. Career concerns, for instance,
are thought to exert a comparatively larger influence than direct financial rewards (Gibbons &
Murphy 1992). This may be particularly important in the bureaucratic environment that I study
(the Chinese school system). ‘Bureaucratic incentives’ (particularly for managers) are often char-
acterized as being less explicit and instead appealing to the career concerns of individuals as well
as a sense of organizational ‘mission.’ Career prospects tend not to be based on outcomes (such as
the success of a project) but on compliance with implicit or explicit rules or constraints (often re-
lated to organizational mission—Wilson 1989). This is due to the fact that outcomes are often less
observable and less attributable to an individual (Wilson 1989). Thus, administrators may avoid a
task if they do not view it as being in line with the primary mission of the organization or believe
doing so would violate organizational rules. Bureaucrats themselves also tend to be extremely
cautious, either due to self-selection of more risk-averse individuals or the nature of organizational
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incentives (Wilson 1989; Dixit 2002; Dasgupta & Sarafidis 2009; Buurman et al. 2012). As a result,
bureaucrats may avoid a task that they view as uncertain or risky. An unfavorable outcome, in
particular, could highlight a deviation from organizational rules or more traditional objectives.2
The influence of the career concerns of managers may be important in a bureaucratic setting if
project outcomes are viewed as uncertain (such as an anemia reduction program), especially given
the tendency of bureaucrats to be risk averse.
4.1.2 Incentive Size
A secondary question about managerial incentives tested directly is one of the most basic
questions of contract design: How do the e↵ects of P4P incentives vary by incentive strength?
Specifically, how do outcomes vary by the “slope” of incentive contracts? Theory suggests that
stronger incentives should elicit more e↵ort from agents, certeris paribus. However, empirical
evidence from a variety of contexts has shown that small incentives or prices can lead to relatively
large changes in behavior (Kremer & Miguel 2007; Thornton 2008; Banerjee et al. 2010; Cohen &
Dupas 2010; Karlan et al. 2011; Duflo et al. 2011). The findings in these studies suggest that the
existence of incentives or a price may be more important than the actual level of incentives.
On the other hand, other studies have suggested that incentives (small ones in particular) can
actually worsen performance because contracts can contain signals and information (for example,
di culty) that may reduce e↵ort (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011).
This would occur if the negative e↵ect of signals contained in incentives are stronger than the price
e↵ect (the potential for larger rewards). The relationship between incentive size and e↵ort is
even less clear in the case of prosocially-motivated agents. When the incentivized task has a
prosocial component, incentives can crowd out or substitute internal motivation. In this case the
relative impact of small and large incentives depends in part on how this crowding out e↵ect varies
with incentive size. Further, crowding out e↵ects may be larger in the case of rewards based on
social outcomes (as opposed to inputs) since these correspond more directly with agents’ internal
2These characteristics are highly relevant in the Chinese context (Tan 2001). I also found these to be important




4.2 Resources and Incentives
4.2.1 Resource E↵ects
There are several reasons to believe that increasing the amount of resources under adminis-
trator control alone may be su cient to meaningfully improve nutritional outcomes absent explicit
incentives to do so. First, although funds are fungible, they may have a tendency to “stick” to their
intended use (a so-called flypaper e↵ect - Hines and Thaler 1995). Second, administrators may
also view the program as su ciently aligned with organizational mission or professional norms.
Third, program uncertainty and connection to career concerns may also be less of a concern for
administrators (relative to incentives) if they do not feel others would hold them liable for pro-
gram outcomes. Fourth, increasing the amount of resources under control of administrators also
(in e↵ect) increases their autonomy (or decision making authority - at least over fiscal resources).
The public administration literature heavily emphasizes the motivational e↵ects of additional au-
tonomy (Rose-Ackerman 1986; Perry & Wise 1990). Thus, increasing the amount of resources
under administrator control may have an e↵ort-inducing e↵ect beyond any e↵ect from an increas-
ing resources alone. Finally, increasing the amount of resources under administrator control may
have additional e↵ects on e↵ort due to a sense of obligation. Specifically, being provided with
funds (and responsibility) for the specific purpose of reducing anemia may - in itself - induce a
sense of obligation to e↵ectively implement an anemia reduction program. Such an e↵ect could be
connected to professional norms or organizational mission; however, a more general e↵ect due to
being endowed with resources for an expressed purpose could also play a role (to my knowledge
this is untested in the literature).
4.2.2 Resource and Incentive Complementarity
A primary interest in this study is how resources (which are increased to fund a new ac-
tivity) interact with explicit incentives. Most production technologies will exhibit some degree
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of substitutability between e↵ort and resources. As resources increase school administrators may
decrease e↵ort (which is costly in utility terms), if less is needed to achieve the same outcome.
Similarly, increasing resources available to administrators could weaken incentives to expend e↵ort
to bring in extra-marginal resources (work through households to improve nutrition at home, for
instance).
E↵ort and resources could also be complements in the technology. For example, with enough
resources, the administrators could make investments that will increase the marginal productivity
of e↵ort. More simply, lack of resources could also merely constrain the feasible set of managerial
actions. This is a concept emphasized in the literature: several studies have argued that incentives
and control (or autonomy in the organization) are closely linked and that autonomy is a necessary
condition for incentives to improve e ciency (Verhoest et al. 2004; Prendergast 2002; Athey and
Roberts 2001; Gibbons 2009; Qian 1994; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Aghion and Tirole 1997).
Incentives and resources may also interact for psychological reasons. In the last decade,
several studies have shown that incentives can also backfire (see recent surveys by Gneezy et
al 2011 and Kamenica 2012). Although this literature analyzes the e↵ect of incentives given a
level of resources, some of its insights can also shed light on how incentives and resources may
interact. For instance, Benabou and Tirole (2003) note that incentives can be detrimental if they
signal that a task is di cult. Presumably this would most likely occur if an agent (a school
administrator) believes the principal (education ministry o cials) has superior knowledge of the
technology producing student nutrition. In the current setting, it is possible that incentives, larger
block grants, or their interaction signal task di culty or complexity. Benabou and Tirole (2006)
also note that an individual might not engage with incentivized pro-social tasks. If their peers,
friends or neighbors know that an agent has incentives for a task, this creates uncertainty as to
the true motivation of the agent’s e↵ort. If the agent’s original motivation for performing a task
is based on image, they may be less likely to provide e↵ort if given an incentive. In our setting
a larger grant could increase visibility, amplifying this negative e↵ect of incentives. 3 Note that
3Strictly speaking, this e↵ect might also be present if actions are not visible to others, but self-image is important,
that is, assessing oneself as in the eyes of an “impartial spectator.”
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the incentivized task need not be purely pro-social: a similar e↵ect could occur when a task is
considered part of an organization’s mission.
The general insight of Benabou and Tirole (2006) is that incentives have consequences about
how one’s actions are interpreted by others as well as themselves. A similar idea is expressed by
Heyman and Ariely (2004) who note that monetary incentives can cause individuals to shift from
a ‘social’ to a ‘monetary’ decision-making frame. Thus a risk averse manager may choose not
to invest in a profitable task which has a positive probability of a bad outcome if she believes
that incentives (or ability to profit personally) would make the outcome more attributable to her.
This may be particularly relevant in bureaucracies where, as discussed, more weight is put on
an individuals adherence to organizational norms or rules rather than outcomes (Wilson 1989).
Increased resources could exacerbate such an e↵ect since more resources expand the set of feasible
risky activities. How incentive reframe a task could also potentially negate or o↵set any e↵ects
that increased resources have on e↵ort. An administrator who otherwise feels an obligation to
e↵ectively use resources she is endowed with, for instance, may feel that she can ’pay’ to avoid this
obligation in foregone incentive pay.
4.3 Multiple Tasks and Incentives
4.3.1 Multitasking and School-based Nutrition Programs
A common feature of public organizations is that they are often charged with multiple func-
tions or roles, often for which success is not easily measured and thus they cannot be contracted
upon (Dixit, 2002). In reference to education, Dixit (2002) describes school systems as “multi-
task, mulitprincipal, multiperiod, near-monopoly organization[s] with vague and poorly observable
goals.” In such a setting, it is possible that the introduction of performance pay tied to a subset
of these functions can refocus resources away from others. School systems are prime examples of
organizations with multiple roles. Schools are often charged with: increasing marketable skills of
students, instilling behavioral norms, infusing national identity, and promoting health, to name a
few. In developing countries, the school’s role as a platform for public health interventions is often
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given added importance as school systems are used to supplement underdeveloped public health
systems (Bundy et al., 2006). This implies a multi-tasking problem (a la Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991) and Baker (1992)), suggesting that the relative strength for organizations to devote e↵ort
and resources to these roles have important implications for performance. 4
4.3.2 Incentives and Task Complementarity
I examine multitasking e↵ects of incentives directly in the context of school-based health
programs as part of the experiment. I abstract from the issue of observability, however, and focus
on the question of how performance incentives based on aligned and misaligned outcomes a↵ect
outcomes. Specifically, I examine how anemia-based incentives and test-based incentives each
a↵ect anemia and academic performance (exam scores). I also test whether these two incentives
are complements or substitutes in the production of student nutrition and academic performance
(and the combined e↵ect of the two incentives). 5
Beyond testing the direct e↵ects of anemia incentives on anemia reduction and test incentives
on test scores (and interactions), the experimental design allows me to simultaneously examine
how incentives a↵ect more vs less aligned outcomes. Because anemia reduction is an input to
academic production, actions taken by principals to reduce anemia should be complementary with
improving academic performance. If principals believed that reducing anemia could raise academic
performance (as they were told during training), performance incentives tied to test scores may
also strengthen incentives to reduce anemia. The converse is not true, however, since academic
4Evidence of multitasking e↵ects has been found in a number of empirical studies of service delivery. Rasul
and Rogger (2013) show evidence that incentives are negatively correlated with project completion in part because
incentives skew the allocation of bureaucratic e↵ort toward more easily observed and contractable projects. Further,
this negative correlation is strongest for more complex and ’unfamiliar’ projects. Vermeersch and Kremer (2005)
find that a subsidized school-based meal program in Kenya crowded out teaching time by 15%. In their study of
incentives for local governments to provide health and education services in Indonesia, Olken, Onishi and Wong
(2012) find evidence that expenditures were re-allocated from education to health spending; however, they find no
decline in education outcomes and attribute this decline in spending to an increase in technical e ciency.
5Interest in testing these hypotheses was largely motivated by the findings of the pilot study implemented in
2009-2010 in a smaller number of schools. In that study it was found that 1) anemia reduction incentives had a
much larger e↵ect in schools where administrators had pre-existing incentives for good exam scores (Miller et al.
2012) and 2) that incentives for anemia reduction improved test scores for anemic students (presumably through
improved health) but had a significant negative e↵ect on scores for students healthy at baseline (Sylvia et al.
2013). These findings suggest that anemia reduction incentives may have crowded out educational inputs (but
this was counteracted by improved health for initially anemic students), but that test score incentives and anemia
incentives may be complementary in the direction of improved student health. These results however we based on
non-experimental variation in existing test score incentives. In this study, I introduce exogenous variation in test
score incentives and an arm with both incentives to test complementarity.
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performance is not an input to anemia reduction. How test incentives impact anemia, therefore,
illustrates the case where incentives are relatively better aligned with a task. Anemia incentives, on
the other hand, do not strengthen incentives to raise test scores and any positive e↵ect of anemia
incentives on academic performance should solely be due to the e↵ect of improved nutrition.
Consider a basic model of multitasking where school administrators choose (unobservable)
e↵ort (including e↵ort and resources), e ⌘ (eA, eT ), which can be devoted to reducing anemia
or raising test scores. Assume administrators are faced with a production function for anemia
reduction that increases strictly with e↵ort devoted to reducing anemia, A = f(eA)67 and an
’educational production function’ that increases with e↵ort devoted to raising test scores and with
anemia reduction, T = g(eT , A). Further, expending e↵ort is costly and this cost is given by C(e)
which is strictly convex and continuously di↵erentiable. Increasing e↵ort in one dimension is also
assumed to increase the marginal cost of e↵ort in the other, i.e. C
TA







Letting P denote the compensation of a school administrator comprised of a base wage and bonuses
tied to anemia reduction and test scores,
P = w̃ +  AA+  TT
The administrator chooses eAand eT to maximize
P   C(e) = w̃ +  AA+  TT   C(e)
Assume A = eA. Then, the first order conditions are
C
A
=  A +  T g
A
(4.1)
CT =  T g
T
(4.2)
6This could also be thought of as a production function for hemoglobin concentration.
7Although potential shocks to outcome measures are an important consideration of outcome-based contracts,
deterministic production functions su ce for this illustration.
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So administrators choose e↵ort in the two dimensions to equate the marginal cost of e↵ort
in each dimension with the marginal revenue from increasing that e↵ort. This model has four
implications. First, trivially, administrators o↵ered a bonus tied to anemia reduction will increase
e↵ort devoted to anemia reduction. Second, adding a bonus for anemia reduction only will lead to
a reduction in e↵ort devoted to test scores. This follows from the fact that increasing eA increases
the marginal cost of eT .8 Note, however, that the ultimate e↵ect on academic performance is less
clear and also depends on how test scores improve with better health, g
A
. Third, the e↵ects of a
bonus scheme rewarding test scores only is unclear. Because A contributes to the production of
test scores (and administrators know this), how increasing  T a↵ects eT and eAnot only depends on
direct ’price’ e↵ects but also on administrators’ perception of g
A
. How administrators will respond
when both dimensions are rewarded is similarly unclear and will additionally depend on cross price
e↵ects which are ambiguous (Mullen, Frank & Rosenthal 2010; Sherry, Bauho↵ & Mohanan 2013).
8To see this, set  A > 0 and  T = 0. Totally di↵erentiating the first order conditions yields:
CAAde
A + CAT de
T   d A = 0
CTAde
A + CTT de
T = 0








which shows clearly that the reduction in e↵ort devoted to test score improvement is proportional to the increase
in e↵ort devoted to anemia reduction. Further, in line with common sense, this reduction will increase with
administrators’ perceptions of how increasing e↵ort devoted to anemia reduction increases the marginal cost of test
score e↵ort and will decrease with their perception of how much the marginal cost of test score e↵ort increases with
additional units.
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Chapter 5: Experimental Design, Data Collection and Empirical Approach
5.1 Experimental Design
5.1.1 Power Calculations
Power calculations were conducted before the beginning of the trial by Montecarlo simulation
using parameter estimates from a 2010 pilot study. From the pilot study data, the intraclass
correlation was estimated using a subsample of anemic students and adjusting for a number of
covariates (lag value of the outcome variable, number of students in schools, whether the school
has a canteen, student-teacher ratio, distance to the furthest village served by the school, percent
boarding students, county dummies). After adjustment, the intraclass correlation at the school
level for hemoglobin was found to be 0.11.
In addition, the following parameters were assumed:
15% loss to follow-up
50 children tested per school
13 anemic at baseline tested at follow-up accounting for loss
30.6% anemia rate (at 120 g/L cuto↵)
Monte Carlo simulations using 500 replications were run on the regression:
Hb
is
= ↵+  1Tests +  2Anemias +  3(Tests)⇥ (Anemias) + "is (5.1)
using the subsample of anemic students at baseline in the Subsidy and Anemia Incentive arms of
the pilot study. Where Test
s
is an indicator for whether the school administrator had a (non-
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experimental) performance incentive tied to student test scores and Anemia
s
is an indicator for
whether the school was in the Anemia Incentive experimental group.
Based on these simulations, 260 schools with 65 schools in each arm give 96% power to
detect a test incentive e↵ect (b1) of 0.25*sd, 100% power to detect an anemia incentive e↵ect (b2)
of 0.35*sd, and 57% power to detect a coe cient on the interaction term (b3) of -0.2*sd (all at 5%
significance) where sd = the standard deviation of the residual = 1.03762. Note that this estimate
did not take into account gains from stratification.
Power calculations were also done for test score outcomes. However, given the higher ICC,
more power was needed for anemia outcomes so these were used to determine sample size.
5.1.2 Sampling
A canvas survey was conducted in August 2011 in 36 nationally-designated poverty counties
in five regions of Qinghai, Gansu, and Shaanxi provinces (Shown in Figure 5.1). This survey
yielded a list of all primary schools and the number of students enrolled in each as reported by the
local education bureaus. From this list, schools were eliminated that had less than 150 or more
than 300 students.1 The remaining list served as the sampling frame, and 300 of these schools
were randomly selected for inclusion in the study. To minimize the possibility of contamination,
only one school was selected per township. 2
5.1.3 Allocation
Experimental allocation was done using a 3-by-2 factorial design. After conducting our
baseline survey in September 2011 (at the beginning of the 2011-2012 academic year), I randomly
assigned each of 300 study schools to one of the ten experimental cells shown in Figure 5.2. The
five paths show the randomly-assigned incentive groups: a group without incentives (Group A),
1A lower bound of 150 students was chosen to ensure that the number of samples students per school was enough
to meet power requirements. 300 was chosen as the upper bound to keep the project within budget. These bounds
are on reported school sizes; actual numbers of students are often significantly less than reported. Note that 39.9%
of rural primary schools in the sampling frame (all rural primary schools in project counties) were reported to be
within this range.
2Local administration of schools is generally done at the school district level, which is below the township.
Contamination due to two school administrators meeting at events organized at higher levels, for example, was thus
unlikely.
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300 Schools  
Group A: No 
Incentive 
(65 Schools) 
Group B: Small 
Anemia Reduction 
Incentive (40 Schools) 
Group C: Large 
Anemia Reduction 
Incentive (65 Schools) 
A1. Small Block 
Grant 
(32 Schools) 
A2. Large Block 
Grant 
(33 Schools) 
B1. Small Block 
Grant 
(20 Schools) 
B2. Large Block 
Grant 
(20 Schools) 
C1. Small Block 
Grant 
(33 Schools) 
C2. Large Block 
Grant 
(32 Schools) 
Group D: Test Score 
Incentive (65 Schools) 
D1. Small Block 
Grant 
(32 Schools) 
D2. Large Block 
Grant 
(33 Schools) 
Group E: Dual 
Incentive (65 Schools) 
E1. Small Block 
Grant 
(33 Schools) 
E2. Large Block 
Grant 
(32 Schools) 
Figure 5.2: Experimental Design
a “small” anemia incentive group (Group B), a “large” anemia incentive group (Group C), a test
score incentive group (Group D), and a dual incentive group (Group E). I orthogonally crossed
these three incentive arms with two block grant groups: a “small” block grant group (Group 1) and
a “large” block grant group (Group 2). Because knowledge about anemia in our study areas was
negligible, we conducted a health education campaign about anemia in all study cells (described
in detail in below).3 The primary reference group in this ten-cell design is the default policy
(education about anemia coupled with a modest budget transfer and no incentives), Group A1. 4
To improve power, I used a stratified randomization procedure. Specifically, the random-
ization process was stratified on baseline mean school-level hemoglobin concentration and mean
combined standardized math and Chinese exam scores. Each of these variables was divided into
5 strata yielding 25 total blocks. The analysis takes this randomization procedure into account
(Bruhn & McKenzie 2009).
A map of study sites is shown in Figure 5.3.
3In the pilot study, we found that educating school administrators on anemia (providing the same information
as in the current study) alone, without incentives or grants, had no detectable impact on anemia rates.
4This is, for example, how a recent school feeding policy, to which the government has appropriated 16 billion
yuan annually, has been implemented in many areas in practice. Under the program, local education bureaus and
schools receive 3 yuan per day per student (4 yuan for boarding students) to provide nutritious meals. How exactly
the program is implemented and monitored varies widely across localities.
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Figure 5.3: Study Sites
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5.1.4 Interventions
5.1.4.1 Health Training on Anemia
Because knowledge about anemia in the study areas was negligible, all 300 school ad-
ministrators in the study were given training on iron deficiency anemia prior to revealing their
randomly-assigned study cell. Training materials were based on published, peer-reviewed studies
and specifically included information about: a) the prevalence and causes of anemia, b) the con-
sequences of anemia (including its e↵ect on cognitive development and academic performance),
and c) e cacious nutritional approaches to reduce anemia (increasing dietary intake of iron-rich
foods, nutritional supplementation with iron fortified soy and flour or with supplements, etc.).
This training was given through a presentation by a nutrition expert from a local university 5 and
reference materials given to school administrators.
5.1.4.2 Block Grants
Across the five incentive arms, schools were randomly assigned to one of two block grant
groups: small (Group 1 in Figure 5.2) or large (Group 2 in Figure 5.2). Although funds were
given in the context of the nutrition program roll out, administrators were free to allocate these
to other school functions at their discretion. The small grant was 0.3 yuan ( 0.05)6 per student
per day (85 schools), which is adequate to purchase a supplement for each student to take daily.
The large grant was 0.7 yuan per student per day ( 0.11) (85 schools). In total, small block grant
schools received 7,452 yuan ( 1,183) on average and large block grant schools received 17,388
yuan ( 2,760). For reference, school budgets in the project area were approximately 500 yuan per
student per year (or 4 yuan per day).
These grants were given to schools in two installments, once at the beginning of the program
and another approximately half way (see Figure 5.4). Because a market for iron supplements and
multivitamins did not exist in many project areas, administrators were given the option to purchase
5A translation of the transcript is in the appendix.
6I use a conversion rate of 1 = 6.3 RMB throughout.
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vitamins from the Chinese Center for Agricultural Policy at cost. They initially decided how much
to purchase when they first learned of the grant and filled out their “planning budget” (see data
collection below). Administrators were aware that they would receive vitamins in kind and the
remainder of the grants in cash. Prior to the distribution of the first installment of the grant,
administrators were contacted to confirm their vitamin order. They were also told that they could
make contact anytime to change vitamin orders if they chose to do so. The same procedure was
followed for the second installment at the beginning of semester 2.
5.1.4.3 Incentives
The incentive arms were as follows. In the small anemia-reduction incentive group (40
schools, Group B in Figure 5.2), administrators were given contracts detailing a financial incentive
to be paid to them as private income according to the net reduction in number of sample students















is the number of sample students found to be anemic at baseline and N
e
is the
number of these same students who were anemic at the time of the endline survey. The contract
increment (12.5 yuan (RMB) per student reduction– approx. 2) was set using experience from the
pilot study to provide an additional 0.2 months of a principal’s annual salary for a feasible reduction
in anemic students.7 The small size of this incentive was chosen so that rewards themselves were
of little monetary value.
The large anemia reduction incentive group (65 schools, Group C in Figure 5.2) was identical
to the small incentive arm except that the magnitude of the incremental incentive was ten times
greater (125 RMB, or about 20):
7There are presumably superior contract structures, however this structure was chosen for simplicity. Readily-













This contract increment implies 2 additional months of annual salary for a feasible reduction
in anemia prevalence. If the anemia rate increased over the school year, administrators did not
receive a payout.
Administrators in the test incentive group (65 schools, Group D in Figure 5.2) were given an
incentive contract stipulating rewards based on the average gain in student scores on standardized












For every 1 point gain in the average of student scores on standardized exams in math and
Chinese (combined) principals received 800 yuan (approx. 125). This was calibrated such that a
reward for a 0.2 SD increase was approximately equal to one month’s salary. Principals were not
penalized for a reduction in average exams scores.
The final incentive group, the dual incentive group (65 schools, Group E in figure 5.2),
received both the large anemia reduction and test incentives. An example of this dual contract is
in the appendix.
5.1.5 Implementation
At the time of treatment, principals first received training on anemia. Following this, re-
search team members revealed randomly-assigned study groups to principals, told them how many
sampled students in their schools were anemic at baseline (the identity of these children was
not revealed), and signed incentive contracts with principals. Contracts were written on Chinese
Academy of Sciences letterhead (which is part of the Chinese Government) and counter-signed
by the deputy director of the implementing research center (principals signed two copies of the
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contract, one of which they took with them). Contracts were also stamped with the o cial seal of
the Chinese Center for Agricultural Policy. At the same time, administrators were informed of the
grant they would receive and made an initial decision on what portion they would spend on mul-
tivitamins. Note that all interventions were implemented in partnership with the local education
bureaus. Beyond being a necessity in China, doing so also creates the impression to participants
that interventions were a government program.
5.2 Data Collection
5.2.1 Sampling
Data collection e↵orts within schools focused on 4th and 5th grade students.8 Within
each school all 4th and 5th grade students were given student surveys (discussed below). For
hemoglobin tests, 50 fourth and fifth grade students were randomly selected.9 To minimize the
possibility that administrators with performance incentives later reallocated resources based on our
baseline sample, all students in the school were administered surveys in the baseline. Students in
other grades were also sampled for physical examinations. Hemoglobin tests were given to children
in sixth grade, but only height and weight was collected for children in grades 1-3.
5.2.2 Surveys
We conducted our baseline survey in September 2011 (at the beginning of the 2011-2012
academic year), implemented our experimental interventions in October 2012, and conducted our
follow-up survey in May 2012 (at the end of the same academic year).
Both rounds collected detailed information on students, schools, school administrators,
teachers, and households. Student surveys included modules on student background, various health
inputs received from schools possibly related to anemia reduction activities (meals eaten at school,
distribution of supplements, etc), academic activities including questions on teacher behavior, and
84th and 5th grade students are old enough to fill out tests and survey instruments yet too young for a significant
number to have gone through puberty, which can complicate interpretation of hemoglobin readings.
9When there were less than 50 students in the two grades, all students were tested.
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general health. To collect information on school and home feeding practices, students were also
given food frequency questionnaires asking about food consumption at school and at home over
the past week. Although information on student background (including household characteris-
tics) were included in student forms when possible, a household survey was also administered to
collect additional information on household behavior (including anemia-related and academic in-
vestments) and household characteristics that were unlikely to be known by students themselves.10
School surveys collected basic information on schools, school finance, and kitchen operations. The
teacher survey mainly collected information on teacher background and teaching practices. Home-
room teachers (banzhuren) were given an additional module on student health and school-based
health and nutrition related activities.
The school administrator survey collected detailed background information on the school
administrator as well as other types of information pertinent to incentive contracts. The basic
background information on school administrators included education, teaching experience, admin-
istration experience, current structure of pay. In addition, school administrator surveys included
a module designed to attempt to measure di↵erent subjective perceptions of school administrators
that could influence responses to performance pay (including risk preferences, discounting, and
social preferences (intrinsic and pro-social motivation). 11
Several additional types of information were also collected. First, immediately after princi-
pals signed incentive contracts and learned of block grants, they were asked to fill out a non-binding
budget were they chose how to allocate program funds across di↵erent items. Budget items in-
cluded 20 di↵erent nutrition-related (food, supplements, etc.) and education-related (teacher train-
ing, books, computers, etc) inputs. Administrators could also write in whatever they wished to
purchase. Note that it was emphasized that this budget was non-binding and administrators could
10For funding reasons, household forms were not administered by enumerators. These forms were sent home with
children to fill out with their parents. Once completed these were returned to homeroom teachers who were provided
with pre-paid envelopes to mail these to the implementing research center.
11We measured intrinsic motivation (motivation from enjoyment of the act of doing one’s job) and pro-social
motivation (motivation from desire to a↵ect a pro-social outcome) using psychological scales developed in Grant
(2008) translated into Chinese. Although we have not formally established the validity of these scales in China, the
questions are not particularly culturally or linguistically sensitive and the measures co-vary with other characteristics
in our data in expected ways.
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change their mind at any time. 12 An example planning budget is shown in the appendix.
Data on school system characteristics was collected using a survey of school district super-
intendents. This survey was conducted by telephone at the time of the baseline survey. School
district superintendents were asked questions regarding school district characteristics and school
district policies regarding the management of school administrators.
5.2.3 Primary Outcomes
The primary outcomes for the trial are student hemoglobin concentration (Hb) (and anemia
defined as altitude-adjusted Hb<120 g/L) and student performance on standardized exams in
math and Chinese. To collect hemoglobin concentration measurements, nurses from Xi’an Jiaotong
Medical School accompanied enumerators during the baseline and endline surveys. Hemoglobin
levels were measured on-site (at schools) using HemoCue Hb 201+ systems – a procedure considered
state-of-the-art.13 Before surveys, nurses were extensively trained on the appropriate method of
drawing and testing capillary blood samples.
To assess gains in student achievement, standardized exams in math and Chinese were
developed in collaboration with local education bureaus based on the national curriculum. One-
half of the students in each class were randomly assigned to take either the math or Chinese exam.
Questions for the math exam were taken from the question bank of the Trends in International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Chinese test was designed with the help of
the Shaanxi Provincial Education Bureau. The exams were extensively pretested to ensure they
adequately captured variation in student achievement. In analysis exam scores are normalized by
the control group distribution.
12This budget was also used to coordinate orders for iron supplements to be delivered to schools. Administrators
were free to change their supplement orders at any time before vitamins were delivered.
13Each student was only tested once during each round of hemoglobin testing. Although taking multiple mea-
surements per round can help address classical measurement error present in finger-prick assessments, pretesting
suggested that e ciency gains from adding another test per subject did not justify the extra cost.
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5.2.4 Semi-structured interviews
In addition to quantitative survey and test data, qualitative interviews were also conducted
in a convenience sample of 12 schools following the endline survey. Although these schools were
a convenience sample, schools were evenly distributed across trial arms and across the two largest
sample prefectures (both in Gansu province). Using semi-structured interviews, administrators
were asked about their work generally, existing motivations and explicit incentives, how they chose
to implement the nutrition program and their impression of the program generally.
A timeline for data collection and intervention activities is shown in Figure 5.4.
5.3 Empirical Approach
Given random assignment schools to treatment cells shown in Figure 5.2, comparisons of
outcome variable means across treatment groups provides unbiased estimates of impact of each
experimental treatment. However, to increase power, I control for covariates and estimate treat-
ment e↵ects using OLS. These covariates are the same used to conduct power calculations using
data from a pilot project. In addition, all of the analyses presented (including outcome variables,
regression specifications and hypotheses to be tested) were pre-specified in an analysis plan written
and filed before endline data were available for analysis. 14
As specified in the pre-analysis plan, I estimate the e↵ect of group assignment on child-level
outcomes using the following ANCOVA specification:15
Y
isct





isc(t 1)  + µc + ssc + "isct (5.2)
where Y
isct
is the outcome (hemoglobin concentration in g/L, anemia status, or standardized
exam score) for child i in school s in county c measured at endline; T
sc
is a vector of treatment
14This analysis plan was filed with the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at MIT. In instances that deviate
from the pre-specified plan due to data constraints or lack of foresight, I state so explicitly in the text and tables.
15McKenzie (2011) discusses gains in e ciency from using ANCOVA over a di↵erence-in-di↵erence estimator in
estimating treatment e↵ects from randomized experiments. In particular, the ratio of the DID variance to the
ANCOVA variance is 2/(1 + ⇢)where⇢ is the autocorrelation of the outcome variable. Autocorrelations for test






isc(t 1)is the baseline value of the dependent variable; Xisc(t 1) is a vector of
child controls (age, class-year, and gender) and school controls (number of students, student-
teacher ratio, whether the school has a kitchen, proportion of boarding students, and distance to
the furthest village in the school’s catchment area); µ
c
are county fixed e↵ects; and s
sc
are dummy
variables for randomization strata. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level
using the cluster-corrected Huber-White estimator.
For the sake of presentation, I split the analysis to assess specific research questions. To
do this, I use a subset of treatment dummies and limit the sample to the appropriate treatment
groups and the no incentive group. To estimate the treatment e↵ects of large and small anemia
reduction incentives and how they interact with grant size, I use the following specification:
Y
isct
= ↵+  1SIs +  2LIs +  3LGs +  4SIs ⇥ LGs +  5LIs ⇥ LGs + Z 0
isc(t 1)⇣ + "isct (5.3)
SI
s
is a dummy that equals 1 if the administrator in school j was assigned to receive a small
incentive contract and 0 otherwise; LI
s
is equal to 1 if the administrator in school j was assigned
to receive a large anemia reduction incentive contract; LG
s
is equal to 1 if the school received a
large block grant. Z
isc(t 1)includes all controls in Equation (5.2). Here, the estimation sample
is limited to the comparison (no incentive) group and the anemia incentive groups (Groups A,B
and C in Figure 5.2). This specification compares the default policy (i.e., the group that received
training, a small block grant and no incentive) to each of the other experimental groups: b1 gives
the additional impact of adding a small incentive to a small block grant and information (Group
B1 vs A1 in Figure 5.2); b2 gives the impact of adding the large incentive (Group C1 vs A1 in
Figure 5.2); b3 gives the impact of additional resources with the large block grant (Groups A2 vs.
Group A1 in Figure 5.2). Also of interest are coe cients b4 and b5 on the interactions between the
large grant and small and large incentives. These coe cients give the additional e↵ect of incentives
in the presence of the large block grant compared to their e↵ect when combined with the smaller
block grant.
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= ↵+  1AIs +  2TIs +  3(AIs)⇥ (TIs) + Z 0
isc(t 1)⇣ + "isct (5.4)
where AI
s
is a dummy for all schools with a (large) incentive for anemia reduction and TI
s
is





are both 1 for schools in the “dual incentive” group (Group E in figure 5.2).
I estimate this equation using all schools in the trial excluding only the “small” anemia reduction
incentive group (Group B). I estimate this for the combined sample including both the large and
small grant groups (Groups 1 and 2) and also for each group separately.  1estimates the impact
of anemia reduction incentives,  2estimates the impact of incentives for test scores, and  3tests
whether the two incentives are complements or substitutes. In addition to the individual estimates
for  1    3, I also present pairwise Wald tests of H0 :  1 =  2 and the combined e↵ect of the
incentives,  1 +  2 +  3, corresponding to the e↵ect of the dual incentive group.
In addition to the primary outcomes (hemoglobin concentration and anemia), I use the same
specifications (adjusted appropriately for school-level variables) to estimate e↵ects on secondary
outcomes in order to assess the mechanisms through which incentives and block grants worked.
All results presented for secondary outcomes were specified in the per-analysis plan. In the pre-
analysis plan, secondary outcomes were grouped corresponding to specific hypotheses. In addition
to estimating impacts for each variable separately, I also estimate e↵ects on a summary index
for each hypothesis group. These indices were constructed using the GLS weighting procedure
described in Anderson (2008). For each individual, a new variable, s̄
ij
is created that is the weighted
average of the k outcome variables y
ijk
in hypothesis group, j. The weight place on each outcome
variable is set equal to the sum of its row entries in the inverted covariance matrix for hypothesis


























is the inverted covariance matrix, and y
ij
is a column
vector of all outcomes for individual i in hypothesis group j. This procedure can have the added
advantage of increased e ciency since outcomes that are highly correlated receive less weight and
outcomes less correlated (containing new information) receive more weight. Further, s̄
ij
can still
be created for observations with a subset of missing outcomes, these outcomes merely receive less
weight in the index.
5.4 Summary Statistics, Balance and Attrition
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Balance
Summary statistics and tests for balance across study arms are shown in Tables 5.1-5.4.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show summary statics and balance tests for the anemia incentive groups and
cross-cutting block grant groups for the full sample and sample of children anemic at baseline,
respectively. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the same for the large anemia incentive, test and dual
incentive groups for schools that received small block grants and large block grants separately. In
each table, Panel A shows student level characteristics, Panel B shows characteristics of schools,
and Panel C shows characteristics of school administrators. The first two columns of the table give
the mean and standard deviation of each variable in the comparison group. Columns (3) – (7) show
coe cients on treatment variables and interactions estimated using equation (5.1), controlling only
for randomization strata fixed e↵ects. The final column shows the p-value from a test that the
coe cients are jointly zero.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2. Anemic (0/1) 0.232 0.422 12878 0.503
1. Hemoglobin Concentration
(g/L)
133.955 12.806 12878 0.282
B: School Characteristics
4. Age (years) 10.691 1.167 18124 0.925
5. 5th Grade (0/1) 0.527 0.499 18124 0.359
6. Female (0/1) 0.485 0.500 18123 0.961
8. Has Kitchen (0/1) 0.108 0.312 260 0.739
7. Number of Students 204.354 61.355 260 0.643
C. School Administrator Characteristics
9. Student-Teacher Ratio 15.906 4.627 260 0.112
10. Time to Furthest Village
Served (mins)
64.385 47.331 260 0.701
11. Percent Boarding Students
(%)
5.913 12.974 260 0.975
13. Age (years) 40.307 7.241 260 0.661
12. Male (0/1) 0.969 0.174 260 0.784
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Table uses full baseline sample. First two columns show the mean and standard deviation of
the baseline characteristic in the comparison (small grant, no incentives) cell. Hemoglobin concentration and anemia statistics are
shown for the sample of children randomly selected for hemoglobin tests. The remaining characteristics in Panel A  are shown for all
children in the full sample regardless of whether they were selected for the hemoglobin test.  A child is considered anemic if they have
an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines, WHO 2001). Columns 3 through 5 show
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from a regression of the characteristic on incentive group dummy variables estimated
using equation (5.3) but controlling only for randomization strata fixed effects. The final column shows the p-value from a Wald test
that coefficients are jointly zero. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
3. Baseline Exam Score
(Normalized)
-0.000 1.000 18118 0.549
14. Higher Education Degree
(0/1)
0.846 0.364 260 0.920
15. Administration Experience
(years)
8.488 6.167 260 0.487
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics and Balance: Anemia, Test and Dual Incentives (Full Sample)
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2. Anemic (0/1) 0.233 0.423 6456 0.841
1. Hemoglobin Concentration
(g/L)
134.191 12.912 6456 0.215
4. Age (years) 10.713 1.173 9135 0.581
3. Baseline Exam Score
(Normalized)
0.015 0.975 9131 0.143
6. Female (0/1) 0.485 0.500 9134 0.458
5. 5th Grade (0/1) 0.531 0.499 9135 0.291
B: School Characteristics
7. Number of Students 207.094 64.823 130 0.496
9. Student-Teacher Ratio 16.228 4.227 130 0.188
8. Has Kitchen (0/1) 0.063 0.246 130 0.531
11. Percent Boarding Students
(%)
5.327 11.404 130 0.812
10. Time to Furthest Village
Served (mins)
62.031 36.695 130 0.896
C. School Administrator Characteristics
12. Male (0/1) 0.938 0.246 130 0.397
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Table uses full baseline sample of small block grant schools. First two columns show the mean
and standard deviation of the baseline characteristic in the comparison (small grant, no incentives) cell. Hemoglobin concentration and
anemia statistics are shown for the sample of children randomly selected for hemoglobin tests. The remaining characteristics in Panel
A  are shown for all children in the full sample regardless of whether they were selected for the hemoglobin test.  A child is considered
anemic if they have an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines, WHO 2001). Columns 3
through 5 show coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from a regression of the characteristic on incentive group dummy
variables estimated using equation (5.3) but controlling only for randomization strata fixed effects. The final column shows the p-value
from a Wald test that coefficients are jointly zero. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
13. Age (years) 39.313 7.253 130 0.234
14. Higher Education Degree
(0/1)
0.906 0.296 130 0.387
15. Administration Experience
(years)
8.031 6.141 130 0.391
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics and Balance: Anemia, Test and Dual Incentives (Small Grant)
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2. Anemic (0/1) 0.232 0.422 6422 0.466
1. Hemoglobin Concentration
(g/L)
133.724 12.701 6422 0.740
4. Age (years) 10.669 1.161 8989 0.540
3. Baseline Exam Score
(Normalized)
-0.016 1.024 8987 0.837
6. Female (0/1) 0.485 0.500 8989 0.902
5. 5th Grade (0/1) 0.523 0.500 8989 0.680
B: School Characteristics
7. Number of Students 201.697 58.681 130 0.834
9. Student-Teacher Ratio 15.594 5.030 130 0.430
8. Has Kitchen (0/1) 0.152 0.364 130 0.946
11. Percent Boarding Students
(%)
6.482 14.491 130 0.976
10. Time to Furthest Village
Served (mins)
66.667 56.259 130 0.930
C. School Administrator Characteristics
12. Male (0/1) 1.000 0.000 -- --
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Table uses full baseline sample of large block grant schools. First two columns show the mean
and standard deviation of the baseline characteristic in the comparison (small grant, no incentives) cell. Hemoglobin concentration and
anemia statistics are shown for the sample of children randomly selected for hemoglobin tests. The remaining characteristics in Panel
A  are shown for all children in the full sample regardless of whether they were selected for the hemoglobin test.  A child is considered
anemic if they have an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines, WHO 2001). Columns 3
through 5 show coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from a regression of the characteristic on incentive group dummy
variables estimated using equation (5.3) but controlling only for randomization strata fixed effects. The final column shows the p-value
from a Wald test that coefficients are jointly zero. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
13. Age (years) 41.270 7.208 130 0.742
14. Higher Education Degree
(0/1)
0.788 0.415 130 0.306
15. Administration Experience
(years)
8.930 6.255 130 0.855
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics and Balance: Anemia, Test and Dual Incentives (Large Grant)
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5.4.2 Correlation between Hb Concentration and Exam Scores at Baseline
To interpret results, it is useful to see how the two primary outcomes, Hb concentration and
standardized exam scores, are functionally correlated. Figure 5.5 shows the estimated relationship
between hemoglobin concentration and student scores on standardized exams (separately for math
and Chinese) using data on 14,872 4th and 5th grade students for whom Hb measurements were
collected. Hemoglobin concentration in g/L is shown on the x-axis and normalized exam scores
are shown on the y-axis. These functional relationships are estimated using restricted cubic spline
regressions with 4 knots. The “unadjusted” estimates do not adjust for any other covariates. The
“adjusted” estimate adjusts linearly for student age, grade, sex, ethnicity, whether the child boards
at school, household size, the father’s migration status, father’s education, a household asset index,
and province.
It is clear from these estimates that there is indeed a strong relationship between hemoglobin
concentration and exam scores in the sample. Further, the relationship is approximately linear,
at least in Math (P
nonlinear
= 0.93 for Math and P
nonlinear
= 0.57 for Chinese using the adjusted
model). Interestingly, Math scores are positively correlated with Hb concentration well past the
WHO defined threshold for anemia (120 g/L for this age group).
5.4.3 Attrition and Non-response
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 assess attrition of students between baseline and endline. I define attrition
as a missing Hb concentration measure or exam score at endline when one existed for the baseline.
I present OLS regressions of an indicator for a missing values at endline on treatment arm dummy
variables and interactions (as in Equation (5.3)) with and without baseline characteristics. All
regressions control for county and randomization strata dummy variables.
Table 5.6 presents this analysis for anemia incentive groups and cross-cutting block grant
groups. Columns (1) and (2) use the sample of all anemic children in the baseline sample and
columns (3) and (4) use the full sample of children for whom we took hemoglobin measurements at
baseline. I do find some di↵erential attrition between the treatment arms. In all four regressions,
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Figure 5.5: Spline Regression Estimates of the Relationship Between Hb and Standardized Scores
the coe cient on the interaction between the small incentive group dummy and large block grant
dummy is negative and significant. The level of di↵erential attrition, however, is small in magnitude
(the largest estimated di↵erence is 6 percentage points) and the overall amount of attrition in the
experiment is small (5.4% in the full sample). Thus, estimates should not be significantly a↵ected.
16
Table 5.7 shows similar regressions for the large anemia incentive, test and dual incentive
groups. Columns (1) and (2) use the full sample, columns (3) and (4) use the sample of schools
that received small block grants, and columns (5) and (6) show regressions for large block grant
schools. I find no di↵erential attrition across treatment arms for the full sample and subsample of
small grant schools. I do, however, find an approximately 3 percentage point increase in attrition
due to the test incentive in large grant schools. Compared to the mean in the control (0.078), this
is small in magnitude and should not significantly impact results. I will consider the impact of this
in interpretation of findings presented in Chapter 6.
16In main results (below), I find point estimates for the coe cient on the interaction between the small incentive
group and large grant to be close to zero; this small amount of di↵erential attrition is not enough to cause this
to be significantly di↵erent from zero at a conventional level even with conservative assumptions on the potential
outcomes of attriters.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.014 0.017 0.016 0.014
(0.019) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
-0.027 -0.027 0.008 0.007
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
0.010 0.009 0.005 0.002
(0.023) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010)
-0.059* -0.063** -0.039*** -0.035**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014)
-0.007 0.000 -0.023* -0.021*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013)
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000



















Constant 0.118 0.064 0.064* -0.047
(0.103) (0.138) (0.036) (0.058)
Observations 2051 2051 8398 8395
R-squared 0.046 0.051 0.023 0.030
Mean in Small Grant, No Incentive Group 0.073 0.053
NOTES.  Data source: authors’ survey. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown for
treatment group dummy variables and interactions obtained by estimating equation (5.1) (in
addition to what is shown, controlling for county and randomization strata).   A child is considered
anemic if they have an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO





”Free Lunch” Policy School
Percent Boarding Students (%)
Time to Furthest Village Served (mins)
Student-Teacher Ratio
B. Child Characteristics








Dependent Variable: Hemoglobin measurement missing at endline
Children Anemic at Baseline Full Sample
A. Treatments and Interactions
Table 5.6: Attrition: Anemia Incentives
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.015 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
0.011 0.011 0.004 -0.004 0.019 0.027**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
-0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.008 -0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.009*** -0.006** -0.008** -0.004 -0.009** -0.007



















Constant 0.037 -0.013 0.077* -0.001 -0.000 -0.122*
(0.036) (0.053) (0.042) (0.068) (0.058) (0.069)
Observations 12872 12872 6452 6452 6420 6420
R-squared 0.022 0.029 0.017 0.025 0.041 0.049
Mean in Control (No Incentive) Group
NOTES.  Data source: authors’ survey. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown for treatment group dummy
variables obtained by estimating equation (5.3) (in addition to what is shown, controlling for county and randomization strata).
A child is considered anemic if they have an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines,
WHO 2001).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Small Grant Schools
0.048
Baseline Standardized Exam Score
Student-Teacher Ratio
Time to Furthest Village Served (mins)
Percent Boarding Students (%)











Baseline Hemoglobin Concentration (g/L)
Dependent Variable: Test score missing at endline
Full Sample Large Grant Schools
A. Treatments 
Large Anemia Incentive
Table 5.7: Attrition: Anemia, Test and Dual Incentives
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Chapter 6: Results
6.1 Incentives for Anemia Reduction
6.1.1 Main E↵ects on Hb Concentration and Anemia Status
Table 6.1 presents results for the e↵ect of principal incentives for anemia reduction on
hemoglobin concentration and anemia status. In line with the pre-analysis plan, I focus on results
for the subsample of children anemic at baseline (the first two columns of Table 6.1). I also present
results for the full sample of children randomly sampled for hemoglobin testing (Columns 3 and 4
of Table 6.1). Rows 1-5 in the table show the coe cients on treatment variables from regressions
estimated using Equation (5.3). Row 8 gives the mean in the small block grant, no incentive group
(the comparison group).
In addition to Table 6.1, I also present results graphically in Figures 6.1 & 6.2. These
figures plot the estimated e↵ects and 95% confidence intervals for each group based on estimated
coe cients using the sample of initially anemic students (Columns 1 & 2 in Table 6.1). Figure 6.1
does this in terms of predicted endline hemoglobin concentration and Figure 6.2 in terms of the













(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.387 -0.012 1.055 -0.028
(1.101) (0.040) (0.987) (0.020)
2.567** -0.138*** 0.918 -0.045**
(1.044) (0.039) (0.946) (0.022)
4.205*** -0.145*** 2.871*** -0.073***
(1.123) (0.038) (0.989) (0.021)
1.445 -0.042 -0.859 0.027
(1.541) (0.056) (1.340) (0.027)
-4.580*** 0.196*** -3.304** 0.086***
(1.586) (0.058) (1.404) (0.031)
6. Observations 1923 1923 7943 7943
7. R-squared 0.303 0.110 0.348 0.120
8. Mean in Small Grant, No Incentive
Group
129.900 0.360 136.330 0.180
Children Anemic at Baseline Full Sample
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown for
treatment group dummy variables and interactions obtained by estimating equation (5.3)  (controling for
baseline hemoglobin concentration, student age, student grade, student sex, number of students in the
school, whether the school has a canteen, student teacher ratio, distance to the furthest village served,
percent of boarding students, whether the school has implemented the ”Free Lunch” policy, county
dummy variables, and dummy variables for randomization strata).   A child is considered anemic if they
have an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines, WHO 2001).  *,
**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
5. (Large Incentive)X(Large Grant)




Table 6.1: E↵ects of Anemia Reduction Incentives and Block Grant Size on Student Hemoglobin
Concentration and Anemia Prevalence
Columns 1 & 2 of Table 6.1 show that the addition of the large incentive to the small block
grant had a significant impact on student hemoglobin concentration and anemia rates among
students found to be anemic at baseline. The estimated coe cient on the dummy variable for the
large incentive group (coe cient b2 in equation 5.3) implies an average increase in hemoglobin
concentration among these children by 2.57 g/L and reduction in anemia prevalence at endline by
approximately 14 percentage points (a 39% reduction based on the comparison group anemia rate
of 36%). Both e↵ects are significant at 5% and represent meaningful improvements in child health.
In contrast, the small incentive had no detectable e↵ect on average hemoglobin concentration
or anemia. We can reject that the two coe cients are equal (b1 = b2) with a p-value <0.001.
Note that while the number of schools in the small incentive group is less than that in the other
treatment arms, the standard errors on these coe cients are similar.
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Figure 6.1: Total E↵ects of Incentives and Block Grants on Student Hemoglobin Concentration
(g/L)




The results presented thus far show that large incentives, but not small incentives, produced
significant and meaningful reductions in anemia rates among sample students. In this section,
I explore avenues through which incentives may have worked by examining student receipts of
iron-containing supplements and iron-rich foods, information provided by schools to children and
households.
6.1.2.1 Receipts of Supplements and Iron-rich Food
I present results for child and household reported receipt of supplements and iron-rich food
in Tables 6.2 & 6.3. Table 6.2 uses the sample of children anemic at baseline and Table 6.3 uses
the full hemoglobin sample. Panel A shows secondary outcome variables describing supplement
distribution (from household and student surveys) and Panel B shows child reported consumption
of food that is (potentially) rich in iron or promotes iron absorption. Information on food con-
sumption was collected using a seven-day recall “food frequency questionnaires” (FFQs) filled by
students as part of the endline survey. These questionnaires asked children the number of times
they had eaten each of 33 food items in the past seven days, separately for school and home.1 The
final row shows results for the summary index of all variables in the table (using the approach in
Anderson (2008)).
1Food frequency questionnaires (FFQs) such as the one we use have long been used in nutrition research and
have been recommended for use in large surveys of children given low cost and low respondent burden (McPherson
et al. 2000; Magarey et al. 2011). While FFQs are generally believed to overestimate consumption relative to other
approaches (McPherson et al. 2000), it has been shown that the FFQ responses of children (similar in age to those
in our study) regarding their own consumption was more accurate than the responses of their parents (Burrows et
al. 2013). Further, previous studies have shown that FFQ responses in China are sensibly correlated with disease
outcomes (Zhao et al. 2002).
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The results for receipt of supplements and food among children anemic at baseline are
consistent with those for hemoglobin (Table 6.2). This is most clearly seen in the results for
the summary index (Row 13). The addition of the small incentive to the small grant motivated
administrators enough to a↵ect the distribution of supplements (Panel A, Column 2). The large
incentive, on the other hand, a↵ected both supplement distribution and children’s diets at home.
Households with children in large incentive schools report receiving supplements from the school
(Table 6.2, Row 1) and children report more frequent consumption of meat, vegetables and fruit at
home (Table 6.2, Rows 10-12). This suggests that, when given only a small grant, large incentives
led administrators to engage households to improve child nutrition (e↵ectively mobilizing extra-
marginal resources). Rural school administrators in China may be particularly e↵ective in this
regard given their status in the community and connection to parents. Depending on program
goals, however, shifting a portion of this burden to households may not be a desirable result of
performance incentives.
These results for children anemic at baseline are largely consistent with those for the full
sample (Table 6.3). One exception is that small incentives appear to have had an e↵ect on feeding
at home when children not anemic at endline are included. A possible reason for this is that
household of non-anemic children may have been more responsive nutritional information provided
by principals. Thus, less e↵ort was required to change their feeding behavior.
6.1.2.2 Communication with Households
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 examine more closely how administrators may have worked through
households to improve nutrition at home. Here it is also clear that adding large incentives led
administrators to engage more with households. Households in large incentive schools report
more interactions with school personnel and are more likely to report receiving nutrition related
information from the school. Here the results for the sample of children anemic at baseline (Table
6.4) and for the full sample (Table 6.5) are nearly identical suggesting that di↵erences in e↵ects on


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to information rather than targeting by administrators.
6.1.3 Heterogeneous E↵ects by Administrator and System Characteristics
Tables 6.6 (and continued in 6.7) show how impacts of incentives on hemoglobin concen-
tration vary by characteristics and beliefs of school administrators.2 For each variable measured
at baseline (at left), I estimate Equation (5.3) adding this variable and interaction terms between
this variable and b1 through b5.
There are three main findings of note. First, both incentives and resources were more
e↵ective when administrators had a longer tenure at the school (Row 4 in Table 6.6). Given that
the same type of heterogeneity is not found for administration experience generally (Row 3), this
could reflect better specific knowledge of the local environment or closer relationships with parents
that increase administrators’ returns to e↵ort (real and/or perceived). More generally, this suggests
that harnessing specific knowledge may be an important channel for the e↵ects of outcome-based
incentives.
Second, I find that the e↵ect of large incentives is larger among principals who have a high
subjective probability of promotion in the next year (Rows 5-8 in Table 6.6). School systems in
China have set schedules for promotion review for school administrators (typically every 3 years).
Given this, administrators’ subjective expectation of promotion likely reflects whether they do or
do not have an upcoming review. A plausible interpretation is therefore that the (experimental)
performance incentives may have worked to counter the existing incentives inherent in this review
process. That large incentives, but not small incentives, had an e↵ect among this group suggests
that large incentives are needed in this context to counter existing ’bureaucratic’ incentives.
Third, incentives tend to be less e↵ective if administrators believed households had most
responsibility for child health or households were more e↵ective in improving child health (Table 6.7,
Rows 10 and 11). These results suggest the importance of administrator perceptions of whether
schools have a role in student nutrition. In general, administrators did not take this view: at

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































baseline around 15% of administrators believed that schools have a responsibility for student
nutrition and around 68% believed this was the responsibility of parents.
The importance of administrator implicit incentives to focus on traditional school functions
(and organizational mission) is also apparent in how the e↵ects of incentives vary with whether an
administrator thought of nutrition as a having a significant influence on grades (Table 6.7, Row
12). This survey question gave administrators a list of factors that potentially influence student
grades and asked administrators to identify which were most important (they could also write-in
if something was not listed). We find that if an administrator did not choose student nutrition,
the incentives were more e↵ective. A likely explanation is that incentives were not necessary if
principals made a strong enough connection between the tasks of improving nutrition and education
(which they have stronger existing incentives to do).
Finally, the impact of incentives (small incentives in particular) varied significantly with
baseline survey measures of risk aversion and pro-social and intrinsic motivation.3 Incentives were
less e↵ective among more risk-averse individuals (Table 6.7, Row 13 & 14) which could either
have e↵ected how individuals perceived an incentive itself or reflect these individuals being more
constrained by their unwillingness to engage in something like distributing supplements to students.
Likewise, small incentives were much less e↵ective among more pro-socially motivated individuals
(those who report liking their job because they care about helping others—as measured using the
psychological scales from Grant (2008)), possibly reflecting a ‘crowding-out’ e↵ect as is widely
discussed in the literature. That is, while the small incentive increases the performance of school
principals who score low in our pro-sociality scale, it detracts from those who score highly in the
pro-sociality scale. This result coincides with previous studies suggesting that small rewards can
be detrimental among intrinsically motivated individuals (Gneezy & Rustichini 2000).
I do not find that the e↵ects of incentives (either large or small) varied significantly with
variables related to how school systems manage school principals (existing performance incentives,
3Risk aversion was measured with a single stated preference survey question asking administrators how much they
would pay for a lottery ticket with a 50-50 chance of winning 1000 yuan. We identify administrators as risk averse
if their response is below the median for responses in the sample. While not an ideal measure, this response should
provide a rough measure of risk aversion. Our interpretation here assumes that measurement error is classical, but
it is possible that it is correlated with unobservable factors.
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decision making autonomy and monitoring - Table 6.8).4
6.2 Resources and Incentives
6.2.1 Main E↵ects on Hb Concentration and Anemia Status
Estimates in Table 6.1 show that that additional resources under the control of school
administrators (the large block grant) had a large impact on anemia prevalence, absent any explicit
incentives. The estimates in columns 1 & 2 of Table 6.1 for the e↵ect of the large block grant (b3
in equation 1) show that additional resources alone increased mean Hb by 4.2 g/L and reduced
anemia prevalence by 14.5 percentage points (a 40% reduction).
It is useful to compare the compare the e↵ect of additional resources to the e↵ect of incentives
alone in terms of costs.5 Although additional resources were more e↵ective in reducing anemia
rates than large incentives, they are much more costly. The average realized incentive payout to
administrators in the large incentive, small block grant group was 3,303 yuan ( 524.29), or 15.95
yuan ( 2.50) per child based on the average school size. Increasing the size of the block grant
by 0.4 yuan per child per day (for 120 total school days) increase the total size of the grant by
9,936 yuan ( 1,577) per school on average. Based on the estimates in column 2 in Table 3 (and
endline anemia prevalence in the comparison group), adding the large incentive to the small grant
averted 6.57 cases of anemia and adding additional resources averted 6.91 cases per school among
children initially anemic. Thus, the cost per case of anemia averted among this group was 503
yuan ( 79.80) for the large incentive and 1,438 yuan ( 228.24) for the large grant. Using estimates
for the full sample in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 (which are more appropriate for cost e↵ectiveness
calculations in this context), we estimate that the large incentive averted 9.32 cases of anemia on
average per school and the larger grant averted 15.11 cases. For the full sample, therefore, the
4School principals are evaluated as part of the cadre evaluation system (ganbu kaohe zhidu). Under this system,
administrators are typically evaluated based on a rubric of pre-defined criteria (Whiting 2004). These criteria and
weights placed on each are set at the local level and vary widely by locality. Roughly 50% of schools in the sample
had existing performance pay schemes that applied to school administrators. Based on anecdotal evidence from
structured interviews, rewards under this “Teacher Performance Pay Policy” do not vary significantly and most
variation in rewards is due to di↵erences in seniority or work hours, not student outcomes.
5Calculations here are admittedly simplistic. I do not account for monitoring costs or other nutritional benefits,
for example (the cost of figner prick Hb assesments is neglegible when taken to scale and could be incorporated into
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cost per anemia case averted was 354 yuan ( 56.19) for the large incentive and 658 yuan ( 104.44)
for the larger grant. Of course, incentive payouts would be essentially costless if expected total
compensation (base pay and incentive payments) remains constant (for example if incentives are
included in subsequent pay increases).
It is also clear from Table 6.1 that incentives and increased resources under managerial
control are substitutes. The coe cient on the interaction term between the large incentive and
large block grant groups (b5 in Equation 1) is large and significant in all four specifications (Table 2,
Row 5). The combined e↵ect of the large incentive and large block grant together still outperforms
the comparison group: b2 + b3 + b5 = 2.19 (p-value = 0.023) for Hb concentration and -0.087
(p-value = 0.016) for anemia prevalence.6 On the other hand, the marginal e↵ect of the large
incentive given the large block grant is negative and marginally significant: b2 + b5 =  2.01 (p-
value = 0.08) for Hb concentration and 0.058 (p-value = 0.141) for anemia prevalence. For the full
sample, b2 + b5 =  2.39 (p-value = 0.01) for Hb concentration and 0.041 (p-value = 0.041) for
anemia prevalence. Thus, the substitution between incentives and additional resources was so large
that, in the presence of the large block grant, large incentives appear to have had a crowding-out
e↵ect.
6.2.2 Intermediate Outcomes
6.2.2.1 Use of Block Grants
An important distinction between managers and front-line workers is the control they exert
over use of an organization’s resources. How administrators choose to allocate block grants as a
result of incentives may therefore be instructive of the role of incentives for individuals with more
decision making authority within service organizations. In the case of small block grants (results
presented in Section 6.1) there was limited scope for the use of block grants to a↵ect outcomes
given small grant size. Large block grants, however–in addition to increasing the overall level of
resources available to administrators–also increase their relative authority over resource allocation
6For the full sample, b2 + b3 + b5 = 0.48 (p-value = 0.579) for Hb concentration and -0.032 (p-value = 0.085)
for anemia prevalence.
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Figure 6.3: Planned Use of Block Grants
and the potential for the allocation of block grant funds to a↵ect outcomes.
Results for the planned and reported use of block grants are shown in Table 6.9 (and
graphically in Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Planned block grant use amounts (Panel A) are from a non-
binding budget filled by administrators immediately after they learned of incentives and the grants
they would receive. Reported block grant use (Panel B) is from an identical budget from filled
by administrators at the time of the endline survey.7 In this table, the reported expenditure
per student on each of four categories is regressed on treatment dummies and interactions as in
Equation (5.3). Due to limited power for regressions at the school level, however, these regressions
do not include county and randomization strata dummies. 8
7Although reported use of block grants by administrators is likely subject to some reporting bias, this would
only strengthen the results that I find.
8This is a deviation from the pre-analysis plan. Including controls as pre-specified subsumes degrees of freedom
and reduces the e ciency of school-level regressions.
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Figure 6.4: Reported Use of Block Grants
The four spending categories that I examine are foodstu↵, supplements/fortified flour and
soy, communications and transfers to households, and those not explicitly related to nutrition.
“Foodstu↵” includes all school purchases of food (regardless of iron content). “Supplements/fortified
flour and soy” includes school spending on supplements containing iron and fortified flour and soy.
Higher spending in this category may suggest an approach of school administrators that was more
narrowly focused on iron delivery. “Communications/Transfers to households” includes spend-
ing on parent meetings (possibly related to nutrition, but, also possibly not related to nutrition),
other communication or nutrition related education materials and transfers such as food subsidies
given directly to households (direct transfers were rare). The “Non-nutrition” category includes
spending on categories unrelated to nutrition (including spending on educational inputs such as
computers, desks, chairs, stationary, teacher overtime for tutoring, and other spending identified
by administrators as education-related).
Although power to detect school level di↵erences is limited, several patterns can be seen in
these estimates. First, administrators used additional funds with the larger block grant primarily














-1.196 2.994 26.135*** 6.566 -10.951
(3.468) (3.504) (5.236) (8.763) (7.136)
5.321 4.139 4.225 -3.895 -1.395
(3.494) (3.271) (3.164) (5.236) (4.725)
-1.338 -2.242 4.577* -0.297 5.417
(1.989) (1.675) (2.721) (3.815) (4.162)
-2.783 -4.886* 13.066*** -2.379 6.921
(2.835) (2.593) (3.999) (6.050) (5.548)
-3.128 -1.780 18.786*** -6.663 -3.424
(3.023) (2.605) (4.144) (7.018) (5.747)
2.799 2.289 4.864 -3.730 -4.685
(3.979) (3.342) (4.047) (6.256) (5.604)
-1.494* 1.053 3.673*** 1.318 1.087
(0.895) (1.192) (1.345) (2.510) (2.878)
-0.154 -0.267 10.752** 8.525 11.781*
(2.834) (3.141) (5.172) (11.488) (7.007)
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Table shows school administrator ”planned” (Panel A)  and ”reported” (Panel B) use of
block grant funds recorded by having administrators fill out a (non-binding) budget at the onset of the nutrition program and the
same budget form reporting actual use of funds at endline.  Each row shows coefficient estimates (and robust standard errors) from
a seperate regressions estimated using equation (5.3) but excluding county and randomization strata dummies. Dependent variables,
the reported expenditure of grants by category (per student), are shown at left. ”Foodstuff” includes spending on any type of food
purchased using block grant funds; ”Vitamins/Fortified Flour, Soy” included purchases of multivitamins or fortified flour or soy
sauce; ”Communication/Transfers to Households” includes funds used for parent meetings, informational materials for parents, or
direct transfers to households (in cash or kind); ”Non-nutriton” includes spending on education expenditures teacher training,
teacher overtime, tutoring fees for students, academic supplies (computers, stationary, desk chairs, etc) and incentives/prizes for
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Table 6.9: E↵ects of Resources and Incentives on Planned and Reported Use of Block Grants
reported (Panel B) budgets, increasing the size of the grant did not significantly increase spending
on supplements and fortified soy/flour. This is most likely due to administrators allocating funds
to supplements by calculating the number of daily supplements required for the number of students
in their school (and not purchasing more than this).
It is also clear from Table 6.9 that administrators with large incentives and small block
grants did not allocate expenses across categories di↵erently from those with a small block grant
and no incentive (though they initially planned to allocate significantly less to “non-nutrition”
purposes). Hence, better anemia results for administrators with large incentives and small grants
are likely due to the extra e↵ort that they or those that work for them exerted, and not to allocating
the grant di↵erently.
Finally, incentives tied to student anemia reductions, in schools with large budgets, increased
expenditure on items unrelated to nutrition. For the large incentive, this is evident in both the
planned and reported budgets (but is only significant for reported budgets). While surprising, these
results are consistent with the main student nutrition results (above) and student and household
73
reported receipts (below).
6.2.2.2 Receipts of Supplements and Iron-rich Food and Communication with House-
holds
Adding resources with the larger grant increased child receipt of fruits and vegetables at
school, consistent with the budget results showing larger expenditure on food (Table 6.2 & 6.3,
Rows 8 & 9). Importantly, children and households in large block grant schools were also signifi-
cantly more likely to report receiving supplements from the schools. Combined with the observation
that large block grant schools did not spend significantly more from the block grant on supplements,
suggests that the large block grant also led to a more e cient use of inputs. Thus, increasing the
amount of resources under administrator control appears to have also led to an increase in e↵ort.
This is further supported by the increase in communication with households and student-reported
consumption of iron-rich foods at home (Tables 6.2 & 6.3, rows 10-12; Tables 6.4 & 6.5). Increasing
resources led administrators to work through households, absent any explicit incentives to do so.
It is possible that this reflects motivation from additional autonomy heavily emphasized in the
public administration literature (Rose-Ackerman 1986; Perry & Wise 1990). This may also re-
flect a similar ’obligation’ e↵ect whereby administrators felt an obligation to implement programs
e↵ectively precisely because they received a significant amount of resources.
Adding incentives to the large grant, however, once again, largely negates these e↵ects.
The coe cients on the interaction terms (in columns 5 & 6) show that children in schools with
administrators who received incentives in addition to the large grant were less likely to receive
supplements or more food at school or home. Administrators with incentives in addition to the
large grant also appear to have done little to engage households.
6.2.3 Heterogeneity
I find that results for the impact of additional resources vary significantly by whether ad-
ministrators believe that the school has responsibility to improve health (Table 6.11, Row 9).
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Incentives and resources also tend to be less e↵ective if administrators believed households had
most responsibility for child health or households were more e↵ective in improving child health.
(Table 6.11, Rows 10 and 11). These results suggest the importance of administrator perceptions
of whether schools have a role in student nutrition. In general, administrators did not take this
view: at baseline around 15% of administrators believed that schools have a responsibility for
student nutrition and around 68% believed this was the responsibility of parents. I do not find
however that the e↵ect of additional resources varied significantly with any pre specified baseline
school system characteristics (Table 6.12).
I discuss heterogeneity in the interaction between resources and incentives in the next sec-
tion.
6.2.4 Substition and Crowding-out Hypotheses
6.2.4.1 Explanations for Substitution
Above, I find that adding administrator incentives and increased resources under the ad-
ministrator’s control were substitutes. There are a number of plausible explanations for this
substitution. As discussed in section 4.2.2, one explanation is that resources and e↵ort are them-
selves substitutes. In other words, additional units of resources allocated to anemia reduction will
decrease marginal returns to e↵ort. As administrators allocate resources, therefore, they may have
decreased e↵ort (which is costly in utility terms). Based on the results on mechanisms above, a
meaningful manifestation of this may have been how increasing resources a↵ected administrator
e↵ort to engage with households and improve children’s diets at home. Engaging households can be
thought of as a way to bring in extra-marginal resources; as resources available to administrators
increase, incentives to expend e↵ort in this dimension are weakened. This e↵ect could lead to a
large substiuttion e↵ect, particularly if home based strategies are more e↵ective than school-based
strategies.
Another explanation is that incentives were simply not needed to increase e↵ort when ad-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































without explicit incentives tied to anemia reduction – administrators in large block grant schools
did expend more e↵ort than the small block grant group. They both worked to engage with house-
holds and appear to have used the vitmains that they purchased more e ciently. It is di cult to
say whether this was due to an e↵ective increase in autonomy or to an ’obligation’ e↵ect from being
endowed with more resources (see section 4.2.1), but if increasing resoruces under administrator
control itself strengthened incentives (in the broader sense), adding performance incentives would
be less e↵ecive.
6.2.4.2 Explanations for Crowding-out
While the explanations above are likely to explain the bulk of the substitution e↵ect, they
cannot account for the full amount of substitution that I find. The degree of substiution was so
large that, in the presence of the large grant, incentives had a slight negative e↵ect. This e↵ect was
present not only in the results for student anemia outcomes, but also in how principals allocated
the block grant and the inputs that students and household report to have received. Although
the more standard explanations above can account for resources completely negating the e↵ect of
incentives (or vice-versa), they cannot account for this negative e↵ect of incentives. This section
presents exploratory analysis of three alternative hypotheses for this ‘crowding-out’ e↵ect to the
extent permitted by the data.
Hypothesis 1: The Combination of Increased Resources and Incentives Convey Information about
Task Di culty Benabou and Tirole (2003) indicate incentives could have a detrimental e↵ect on
performance if agents infer that the reason for which the principal set up the incentive is that the
task is di cult or unpleasant. In the context of this study, it could be that school administrators
perceived the combination of the large grant and large incentive as an indication that addressing
student anemia would be di cult (and as a consequence devoted less e↵ort and resource to this
task).
Table 6.13 shows estimates for treatment e↵ects on administrator subjective expectations of
their ability to a↵ect the anemia rate in their school. Shortly after administrators learned of their
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contract and block grant, they were told how many children were anemic in their school (from the
baseline survey) and asked the following question:
Think of the number of anemic students found in your school. If you spent (0.3/0.7)
yuan per child per day to address anemia, what is the smallest number of children you
think would still be anemic at the end of the school year?”
Administrators in the small and large grant groups were told the corresponding amount of money.
After answering this question, administrators were asked to provide the largest number they
thought would be anemic. Finally, they were asked what percent chance the number of anemic
children would be between the mid-point (calculated by the enumerator) and the higher number.
Based on responses for the minimum, maximum and percent probability above the mid-point we
derived the mean and variance of each administrator’s subjective distribution assuming a triangu-
lar distribution. 9As part of the endline survey, we asked a similar series of questions but asked
about the number of currently anemic children (administrators had not yet been told the results
of endline anemia tests).
The results for responses immediately after treatment are shown in Panel A of Table 6.13
and results for endline questions in Panel B. At both times, administrator’s beliefs on the average
and variance of the number of anemic children at endline appears una↵ected by the large incentive,
the large grant or the combination. Interestingly, the results are consistent with the idea that the
small incentive conveyed the idea that reducing anemia was relatively easy and hence the expected
number of anemic children at endline is smaller. However, this is no longer true if the small
incentive is provided together with the large grant (these results also convey the idea that there
was informational content in the answers to these questions). While admittedly the power of these
tests is low given few school-level observations, the combination of incentives and resources seems
unlikely to have conveyed that reducing anemia was a di cult task.
9This method of eliciting subjective expectations has been used in a number of studies, including in developing





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hypothesis 2: More Resources Enable Crowding-out of Pure Intrinsic Motivation A common crit-
icism of incentives is that they might damage performance if they crowd-out intrinsic motivation
(Fehr & Falk 2002; Frey & Jegen 2001; Gneezy et al. 2011; Kamenica 2012; Frey et al. 2013). Ac-
cording to this literature, individuals who are pro-socially or intrinsically motivated (for example,
motivated by organizational mission) to exert e↵ort on a task may be less likely to do so when
o↵ered external rewards. One prominent theory for crowding out, based on cognitive evaluation
theory (CET) in psychology, posits that incentives can be perceived as controlling and reduce an
individuals subjective autonomy, crowding out intrinsic motivation as a result (Deci et al. 1999;
Frey & Jegen 2001). This type of ‘motivational crowding’ could thus drive substitution between
incentives and resources if, for example, administrators perceived the increase in resources under
their control as an increase in their own autonomy. If this was the case, incentives may have been
perceived as controlling by this group thus crowding out or displacing intrinsic motivation.
Rows 15-18 in Table 6.11 show heterogeneity in the main results for hemoglobin and anemia
by psychological scales for pro-social and intrinsic motivation. Administrators who score low on the
scale for pro-social motivation appear to drive a portion of the substitution result between the large
incentive and large grant. The substitution result is significantly attenuated for administrators
scoring above the median on the prosociality scale in particular (Row 16, next to last column).
The amount of substitution does not vary significantly with intrinsic motivation (Rows 17 and 18).
To the degree that these scales measure the components of pro-social motivation that would be
important in this context, this result suggests that substitution may not be driven by pure pro-
social or intrinsic motives. While an important source of internal motivation in an organizational
context is a sense of organizational ‘mission’ (Wilson 1989; Rose-Ackerman 1986), this is plausibly
positively correlated with motivation to do one’s job for the benefit of others.
Hypothesis 3: Incentive Contracts Change the Nature of the Task The results for internal moti-
vation in the previous section could suggest that substitution is driven by a more pure pursuit of
self-interest. As discussed, one of the strongest incentives faced by school administrators is driven
by career concerns. In the Chinese education system, like managers in bureaucracies more gener-
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ally, career prospects for school administrators are tied asymmetrically to process and outcomes.
That is, the career benefits of an attributable good outcome may be more limited in a system
where promotion weighted toward tenure given organizational rules are followed. An attributable
bad outcome due to failure to adhere to these rules, however, could more easily a↵ect prospects for
promotion or even lead to dismissal. A bad outcome could highlight deviation from organizational
rules or norms. In China, this asymmetry is heightened by political concerns: a su ciently bad
outcome is much more politically damaging than a good outcome produces political benefits since
these benefits tend to be less publicly visible. More generally, a managers career prospects could
be a↵ected if he is viewed as acting in a way skewed from the organization’s core mission.
In my context, this could help drive substitution between incentives and resources if hav-
ing a performance incentive makes an individual more responsible—or liable—for a bad outcome.
Career concerned and risk averse school administrators may have been cautious in implementing
the nutrition program, particularly given heightened concerns for food safety in China (especially
for meat).10 Incentives could heighten this caution if administrators thought incentives shifted
liability to them. This was not an issue in the case of the small grant-large incentive arm because
administrators were able to do little more than purchase supplements (in their view these were dis-
tributed to them by the ministry of education and considered safe). Increasing resources, however,
also allowed them to buy food, but they needed to procure this locally on their own. I hypothe-
size that—if administrators believed that incentives (which were known to their superiors) shifted
liability to them—incentives would make them more wary of implementing the nutrition program
given uncertainty over food safety. Absent incentives, administrators are just fulfilling their ‘obli-
gation’ to implement the program but, with incentives, they would be doing it for personal profit.
This is consistent with the general insight of Benabou and Tirole (2006) that incentives can a↵ect
how one’s actions are interpreted. In other words, incentives, particularly if visible to others, can
a↵ect an individual’s motivation due to the image that an action portrays. Increased resources
10In rural primary schools administrators are legally responsible for the wellbeing of children while they are at
school. Possibly as a result, administrators with whom we conducted qualitative interviews following the trial
commonly identified student safety as a primary burden. For example, one administrator stated, “The safety of
students is my responsibility. As long as students are at school, I feel the pressure. Only after I see the school gate
locked and students go to sleep can I relax.” We also learned of administrators sometimes making decisions through
open discussions with teachers (and even holding votes), which could be a strategy for avoiding liability.
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with large block grants in this context may have also made administrators’ actions more ‘visible’
(or more likely to be noticed by superiors and others) thus amplifying this crowding-out e↵ect of
incentives.
A di↵ernt, yet similar, e↵ect could also occur even if administrators are not overly cautious
and administrator actions are not visible. As was shown above, increasing the amount of resources
available to administrators to implement anemia reduction programs led to an increase in e↵ort
devoted to implementing the program e↵ectively. This increase in e↵ort may have been due to
existing institutional incentives (professionalism, obligation, etc) that were reinforced by increas-
ing resources under the control of school administrators. Incentives, however, could have shifted
administrators’ perception of the task from being part of their professional role (and hence subject
to institutional incentives) to one that was outside their professional role. In other words, admin-
istrators with incentives felt less of an obligation to e↵ectively implement the program and could
pay not to expend e↵ort with forgone rewards. This explanation is similar to Heyman and Ariely
(2004) who note that incentives can cause individuals to shift from a social to monetary decision
making frame. Here, incentives cause a shift froma professional to personal decision making frame.
I find several results that support mechanisms along these lines. First, substitution is sig-
nificantly larger among administrators with a non-zero chance of being promoted in the next year
(i.e. they will soon be facing a promotion review—Table 6.10, Row 6). While subjective promo-
tion probability could be confounded with unobserved factors (such as motivation and ability),
promotion in most school districts is based on a periodic review (typically every 3 years) and,
anecdotally, is generally based more on seniority and politics than ability.
Also consistent with this explanation is that the substitution e↵ect is stronger among school
administrators who received more visits from school district o cials last year, as well as school
administrators who had more meetings with their supervisors (Table 6.12, Rows 4 & 6). School
administrators who are more closely monitored might be more concerned that superiors would
discover a negative outcome (such as a food safety issue). In other words, their actions were more
‘visible.’
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Thus—while speculative—the available evidence suggests that how incentives change the
perception of the task of implementing the programs contributed to the degree of substitution (or
crowding-out between incentives and resources) that I find. Administrators could have percieved
that incentives changed how others (superiors in particular) viewed the task, particularly perceived
liability for bad outcomes. Incentives may have also changed their own perceptions of the task by
reframing the task from one that was part of their professional responsibility to one that was not.
This is not to say this was the sole factor – it is most plausible that more classical explanations
were the major cause. These behavioral and institutional factors nevertheless likely added to
the substitution between incentives and resources to the degree that the e↵ect of incentives was
negative in the presence of the larger grant.
6.3 Multiple Tasks and Multiple Incentives
6.3.1 Main E↵ects of Anemia Reduction, Test and Dual Incentives
6.3.1.1 Hemoglobin Concentration and Anemia Prevalence
Tables 6.14 and 6.15 present results for the e↵ects of administrator incentives tied to 1)
anemia reduction (“anemia incentives”), 2) standardized exam scores (“test incentives”) and 3)
both (“dual incentives”) on student hemoglobin concentration and anemia prevalence. Table 6.14
shows results for the full (“pooled”) sample (including both small and large grant schools). Table
6.15 shows results separately for small and large grant schools. Each table shows the treatment
e↵ects for anemia incentives (Row 1), test incentives (Row 2) and how the two incentives interact
(Row 3) estimated using equation 5.4 using both the subsample of children anemic at baseline
(Hb<120 g/L) and the full sample of students for whom hemoglobin measurements were taken.
The tables also give p-values for a test that the coe cients on anemia and test incentives are equal
(Row 6) and the estimated e↵ect of the combined (dual) incentive and associated p-value (Rows 7
and 8).












(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.848 -0.056* -0.683 0.000
(0.867) (0.030) (0.746) (0.016)
0.444 -0.058** -0.210 -0.001
(0.924) (0.029) (0.778) (0.017)
0.243 0.052 1.235 -0.007
(1.186) (0.041) (1.004) (0.023)
4. Observations
3030 3030 12110 12110
5. R-squared
0.294 0.111 0.332 0.105
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.670 0.950 0.480 0.950
7. Dual Incentive 1.540 -0.060 0.340 -0.010
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.060 0.030 0.650 0.620
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 130.480 0.320 137.200 0.150
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown for treatment
group dummy variables and interactions obtained by estimating equation (5.4)  (controling for baseline
hemoglobin concentration, student age, student grade, student sex, number of students in the school,
whether the school has a canteen, student teacher ratio, distance to the furthest village served, percent of
boarding students, whether the school has implemented the ”Free Lunch” policy, county dummy variables,
and dummy variables for randomization strata).   A child is considered anemic if they have an altitude-
adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines, WHO 2001).  *, **, and ***
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.




Table 6.14: E↵ects of Anemia and Test Incentives on Hemoglobin and Anemia Status (Pooled)
lence among children found to be anemic at baseline (Table 6.14, Column 2). Both anemia and test
incentives reduced the probability that these children were anemic at endline by 5-6 percentage
points (Rows 1, 2). These e↵ects are statistically indistinguishable from one another (Row 6). The
estimated combined e↵ect of the incentives was similar at 6 percentage points (Row 7). None of
the incentives had statistically significant e↵ects on mean Hb concentration among children ane-
mic at baseline nor did they significantly impact Hb concentration or anemia in the full sample of
children randomly selected for Hb testing (Columns 3 and 4). There is no evidence of a significant
interaction e↵ect between the incentives in the direction of Hb concentration or anemia (Row 3).
Estimating results separately for small and large block grant schools (Table 6.15) reveals sub-
stantial heterogeneity in incentive e↵ects between these two groups. In small block grant schools,
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anemia and test incentives led to mean increases in hemoglobin concentration of approximately 4
g/L among children anemic at baseline and 2-3 g/L among all children with corresponding reduc-
tions in anemia prevalence of 19 and 7-8 percentage points respectively (Panel A). Compared to
endline anemia rates in the no incentive comparison group, anemia incentives reduced anemia by
54% among initially anemic children and by 41% among all children. Test incentives reduced ane-
mia by 52% among anemic children and by 46% among all children. The e↵ects of anemia and test
incentives were statistically similar (Panel A, Row 6). Combining the two incentives had e↵ects
comparable in magnitude to each type of incentive alone (Row 7). Although the point estimate for
the e↵ect of the dual incentive in the estimation using the subsample of children anemic at baseline
is slightly larger in the case of hemoglobin concentration, it is statistically indistinguishable from
the coe cients on anemia and test incentives. Coe cients on the interaction between anemia and
test incentives show that this substitution in the direction of anemia reduction was statistically
significant (Row 3) .
In contrast to school receiving a small block grant, incentives had no e↵ect in large block
grant schools. This finding is consistent with results presented in Section 6.2.
Taken together these results for e↵ects on hemoglobin concentration and anemia prevalence
suggest that (at least in the case of small block grants) incentives in the direction of test scores
are on average well aligned with the task of reducing anemia. That the e↵ects of test incentives
on student nutrition were significant and large in magnitude implies that administrators believed
that there was a causal relationship between anemia reduction and academic performance (as they
were told in the training) and thus viewed anemia reduction as a strategy to increase test scores.
Further, strengthening administrator incentives in the direction of test scores (and educating them
on the relationship between anemia and academic performance) led to e↵ects comparable in mag-
nitude to incentives for anemia reduction. This finding is somewhat surprising given that test
incentives are not perfectly aligned with anemia reduction. Note, however, that test incentives
may have been more familiar to school administrators and any weakening of incentive e↵ects may












(1) (2) (3) (4)
3.749*** -0.196*** 2.359** -0.073***
(1.224) (0.044) (0.957) (0.023)
4.161*** -0.188*** 3.387*** -0.083***
(1.077) (0.042) (0.836) (0.020)
-3.240* 0.207*** -2.764** 0.101***
(1.796) (0.074) (1.344) (0.033)
4. Observations 1570 1570 6077 6077
5. R-squared 0.327 0.141 0.380 0.128
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.710 0.850 0.270 0.670
7. Dual Incentive 4.670*** -0.180*** 2.980*** -0.060***
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 129.900 0.360 136.330 0.180
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.698 0.012 -1.536 0.013
(1.202) (0.042) (1.014) (0.022)
-1.667 0.025 -1.592 0.029
(1.303) (0.041) (1.124) (0.021)
3.062** -0.057 2.446* -0.042
(1.481) (0.053) (1.335) (0.028)
4. Observations 1460 1460 6033 6033
5. R-squared 0.329 0.140 0.330 0.116
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.530 0.780 0.960 0.510
7. Dual Incentive 0.700 -0.020 -0.680 0.000
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.470 0.610 0.510 0.980
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 131.070 0.270 138.080 0.130
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown for treatment
group dummy variables and interactions obtained by estimating equation (5.4)  (controling for baseline
hemoglobin concentration, student age, student grade, student sex, number of students in the school,
whether the school has a canteen, student teacher ratio, distance to the furthest village served, percent of
boarding students, whether the school has implemented the ”Free Lunch” policy, county dummy variables,
and dummy variables for randomization strata).   A child is considered anemic if they have an altitude-
adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines, WHO 2001).  *, **, and ***




Panel A: Small Block Grant
Panel B: Large Block Grant
3. (Anemia)X(Test)
Children Anemic at Baseline Hb Sample
1. Anemia Incentive
2. Test Incentive
Table 6.15: E↵ects of Anemia and Test Incentives on Hemoglobin and Anemia Status (By Grant
Size)
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Also of note is that incentives in the two directions serve as substitutes to the degree that the
combined e↵ect of the incentives (dual incentives) led to no identifiable gain in anemia reduction
above each incentive alone. Thus, there is no added benefit of using both incentives simultaneously
in terms of anemia reduction. This is despite the fact that the total strength of the dual incentive
in this direction is larger than anemia incentives alone.
6.3.1.2 Exam Scores
Using the full sample of students given standardized exams (all 4th and 5th grade students),
I find that students in incentive schools (all types) scored slightly lower on endline standardized
exams compared to no incentive schools (Table 6.16, Rows, 7-9). While there are no distinguish-
able e↵ects on Chinese language scores, both anemia and test incentives reduced math scores by
approximately 0.05 SD. The magnitude of this e↵ect is slight, however, given standards in the
literature.11
Within both small and large block grant schools, both types of incentives had little impact on
standardized exam scores in the full sample (Table 6.17, Columns 7-9). While estimated (negative)
e↵ects among large block grant schools (Panel B) are significant, they are small in magnitude (and
comparable to results pooling large and small block grant schools). In small block grant schools
(Panel A), there is little evidence that incentives had a significant impact on exam scores on average
for the full sample. Point estimates are for the most part, however, are negative.
Among the subsample of children anemic at baseline, I do find some evidence that test
incentives actually had a negative e↵ect when the school had a small block grant (Panel A, Row
2, Columns 1-3). These negative e↵ects are meaningful and imply that test incentives reduced
standardized exam scores by 0.15 SD in math and 0.13 SD in Chinese.
In general, the lack of a positive e↵ect of incentives on exam scores, particularly among
students anemic at baseline, is notable given evidence from previous studies showing iron inter-
ventions leading to increases in hemoglobin concentration and reductions in anemia comparable
11Note that di↵erential attrition in the test incentive group should not a↵ect results qualitatively. Students scoring
higher on baseline exams are less likely to attritt and I find no evidence that treatment e↵ects vary along the baseline















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to what I find here also led to significant increases in exam performance on the order of 0.2 SD
(e.g. Luo et al. 2012). This lack of a positive e↵ect on exam scores is, however, consistent with
results in the pilot study (reported in Sylvia et al. 2013). In the pilot study, I found that incen-
tives for anemia reduction had a slight negative e↵ect on test scores on average but this negative
e↵ect was concentrated among students healthy (not anemic) at baseline. Test scores of children
that were anemic increased in anemia incentives schools relative to control schools. This pattern
of e↵ects could be the result of school inputs being distorted away from “education” inputs (ef-
fort and resources that serve as pure academic inputs). Such a distortion could occur through
a deliberate redistribution of resources by administrators or through more indirect channels (for
example, more teacher attention to previously anemic students in response to an increase in their
class participation). In the pilot study, this distortion was not enough to counteract gains from
improved health. Here, however, one possibility is that this distortion completely negated gains
from improved health.
6.3.2 Heterogeneity by Baseline Quintiles of Hb and Exam Scores
The e↵ect of both types of incentives on the academic performance of students with di↵erent
initial levels of hemoglobin is likely to vary significantly. Indeed, previous trials that provided iron
supplements to children suggest that – for a given amount of iron provided – anemic children
experience larger gains in hemoglobin concentrations compared to non-anemic children (Luo et
al., 2012; Soemantri, Pollitt & Kim, 1985; Soemantri, 1989). Moreover, the benefits of improved
iron status on cognitive function and behavior may not be constant along the distribution of
hemoglobin concentration (Sungthong, Mo-suwan & Chongsuvivatwong, 2002). Children who are
initially anemic, for example, may benefit more from a given improvement than initially healthy
children. Further, administrators may respond to incentives by attempting to target inputs to
children who they believe would benefit most from those inputs. 12
To explore how the impact of the interventions on exam scores varied by baseline anemia
12While a possibility in the case of both anemia and test scores, it would likely be di cult to target inputs to
anemic children since anemia is not physically apparent except in extreme cases.
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status, I estimate how treatment e↵ects vary along the baseline distribution of student hemoglobin
concentrations. Specifically, Table 6.18 shows the estimated impacts of incentives separately by
quintiles of the baseline hemoglobin distribution. Within each quintile, I estimate impacts on
endline hemoglobin concentration (odd-numbered columns) and on standardized math and Chinese
exam scores. Panel A shows estimates for small grant schools and Panel B shows estimates using
large block grant schools.
Focusing on the sample of small block grant schools within which incentives had significant
impacts on hemoglobin concentrations, I find that the e↵ects of anemia incentives and test incen-
tives had more or less consistent e↵ects across the distribution. In the first and second and 5th
quintiles of the baseline Hb distribution, anemia incentives increased hemoglobin concentrations by
approximately 2.8 g/L. Point estimates for the e↵ect of test incentives are slightly larger, ranging
from 2.3 g/L to 4 g/L. This is contrary to what one would expect given that marginal returns to
a given amount of iron are decreasing in baseline Hb. Lack of heterogeneity in anemia outcomes
may, then, reflect di↵erences in inputs.
Neither incentive had positive e↵ects on exam performance in any quintile. The negative
e↵ect of test incentives on academic performance is (somewhat surprisingly) largest among the
students at the bottom of the distribution who also saw large gains in hemoglobin concentration.
While it is di cult to say what led to this result, one interpretation is that education inputs were
reallocated through the two mechanisms alluded to above. First incentives may have led to an
overall reallocation from academic inputs to anemia-reduction inputs.13 Although all students
were a↵ected by the reduction in academic inputs, this negative e↵ect on exam scores could have
been counteracted by the positive e↵ect of improved health for some students. A second type of
reallocation may have occurred due to changes in behavior among initially anemic students whose
health was improved due to treatment. For example, if teachers structure classes toward students
who are more engaged and “ready to learn” (i.e., allocate their e↵ort where its marginal returns
are highest), the improved health of initially anemic students may lead them to demand a larger
13Although more likely in anemia incentive schools, this may have also occurred in test incentive schools if


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































portion of teacher attention. This could explain a less negative e↵ect among students at the lower
end of the initial distribution in anemia incentive schools since their health improved more relative
to their classmates.
Table 6.19 presents incentive impacts by baseline exam score quintile. Again focusing on
small block grant schools, three findings are of note. First, the e↵ects of anemia incentives, test
incentives and dual incentives on hemoglobin are relatively constant (and statistically similar)
across the quintiles (panel A, Rows 1 & 2). Second, the negative e↵ects of incentives on exam
scores are largest for children in the right tail of the initial test score distribution (Columns 8 &
10). A plausible explanation for this finding is that this reflects ceiling e↵ect where the marginal
return to additional inputs (including improved iron status) for these children is low.
6.3.3 Mechanisms
6.3.3.1 Use of Block Grants
Results for the planned and reported use of block grants are shown in Table 6.20 (for the
pooled sample), Table 6.21 (for small block grant schools) and Table 6.22 (for large block grant
schools). Planned block grant use amounts (Panel A) are from a non-binding budget filled by
administrators immediately after they learned of incentives and the grants they would receive.
Reported block grant use (Panel B) is from an identical budget from filled by administrators at
the time of the endline survey. In this table, the reported expenditure per student on each of
four categories is regressed on treatment dummies and interactions as in Equation (5.4). Due to
limited power for regressions at the school level, however, these regressions do not include county
and randomization strata dummies. 14
I examine two nutrition related spending categories (foodstu↵, supplements/fortified flour
and soy), education-related expenditures, and one category that could be either (communica-
tions and transfers to households). “Foodstu↵” includes all school purchases of food (regardless
of iron content). “Supplements/fortified flour and soy” includes school spending on supplements
14This is a deviation from the pre-analysis plan. Including controls as pre-specified subsumes degrees of freedom

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Table shows school administrator ”planned” (Panel A)  and
”reported” (Panel B) use of block grant funds recorded by having administrators fill out a (non-
binding) budget at the onset of the nutrition program and the same budget form reporting actual
use of funds at endline.  Each row shows coefficient estimates (and robust standard errors) from a
seperate regressions estimated using equation (5.4) but excluding county and randomization strata
dummies. Dependent variables, the reported expenditure of grants by category (per student), are
shown at left. ”Foodstuff” includes spending on any type of food purchased using block grant funds;
”Vitamins/Fortified Flour, Soy” included purchases of multivitamins or fortified flour or soy sauce;
”Communication/Transfers to Households” includes funds used for parent meetings, informational
materials for parents, or direct transfers to households (in cash or kind); ”Education” includes
spending on education expenditures teacher training, teacher overtime, tutoring fees for students,
academic supplies (computers, stationary, desk chairs, etc) and incentives/prizes for teachers and







4. Education 16.497 260
B. Reported Block Grant Use at Endline (Per Student)












Coefficient (standard error) on:
N
A. Planned Block Grant Use (Per Student)
Table 6.20: Planned and Reported Use of Block Grants - Full Sample
containing iron and fortified flour and soy. Higher spending in this category may suggest an
approach of school administrators that was more narrowly focused on iron delivery. “Communica-
tions/Transfers to households” includes spending on parent meetings (possibly related to nutrition,
but, also possibly not related to nutrition), other communication or nutrition related education
materials and transfers such as food subsidies given directly to households (direct transfers were
rare). The “Education” category includes spending on teacher training, teacher overtime, tutoring
fees, academic supplies (computers, stationary, chairs, desks, etc), and other spending identified
by administrators as education-related.
Though there is limited power to detect school level di↵erences, several patterns can be
seen in these estimates. First administrators in anemia incentive schools appear to have planned to























8. Education 7.513 130
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Table shows school administrator ”planned” (Panel A)  and
”reported” (Panel B) use of block grant funds recorded by having administrators fill out a (non-
binding) budget at the onset of the nutrition program and the same budget form reporting actual
use of funds at endline.  Each row shows coefficient estimates (and robust standard errors) from a
seperate regressions estimated using equation (5.4) but excluding county and randomization strata
dummies. Dependent variables, the reported expenditure of grants by category (per student), are
shown at left. ”Foodstuff” includes spending on any type of food purchased using block grant funds;
”Vitamins/Fortified Flour, Soy” included purchases of multivitamins or fortified flour or soy sauce;
”Communication/Transfers to Households” includes funds used for parent meetings, informational
materials for parents, or direct transfers to households (in cash or kind); ”Education” includes
spending on education expenditures teacher training, teacher overtime, tutoring fees for students,
academic supplies (computers, stationary, desk chairs, etc) and incentives/prizes for teachers and







4. Education 9.793 130
B. Reported Block Grant Use at Endline (Per Student)












Coefficient (standard error) on:
N
A. Planned Block Grant Use (Per Student)
Table 6.21: Planned and Reported Use of Block Grants - Small Grant Schools
however, are not as clear in the reported use of block grants. Second, administrators with test
incentives planned to spend less on more focused iron delivery (supplements and iron fortified flour
and soy) and more on food compared to anemia incentive. Administrators with test incentives
initially allocated somewhat less to supplements in small block grant schools and more to food in
large block grant schools. Higher allocation to food in large block grant schools may be due to
a belief among administrators that broader nutritional gains may improve academic performance
more than addressing iron deficiency alone. Finally, administrators with dual incentives in large























8. Education 19.001 130
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Table shows school administrator ”planned” (Panel A)  and
”reported” (Panel B) use of block grant funds recorded by having administrators fill out a (non-
binding) budget at the onset of the nutrition program and the same budget form reporting actual
use of funds at endline.  Each row shows coefficient estimates (and robust standard errors) from a
seperate regressions estimated using equation (5.4) but excluding county and randomization strata
dummies. Dependent variables, the reported expenditure of grants by category (per student), are
shown at left. ”Foodstuff” includes spending on any type of food purchased using block grant funds;
”Vitamins/Fortified Flour, Soy” included purchases of multivitamins or fortified flour or soy sauce;
”Communication/Transfers to Households” includes funds used for parent meetings, informational
materials for parents, or direct transfers to households (in cash or kind); ”Education” includes
spending on education expenditures teacher training, teacher overtime, tutoring fees for students,
academic supplies (computers, stationary, desk chairs, etc) and incentives/prizes for teachers and







4. Education 22.999 130
B. Reported Block Grant Use at Endline (Per Student)












Coefficient (standard error) on:
N
A. Planned Block Grant Use (Per Student)
Table 6.22: Planned and Reported Use of Block Grants - Large Grant Schools
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6.3.3.2 Nutrition and Education Inputs
The evidence in the previous section was on how block grants were spent. Tables 6.23 and
6.24 show what student report receiving using data from the student survey.
Table 6.23 shows student-reported receipt of nutrition related inputs - namely, supplements
and meat and fruit at school and at home. Again, I show estimates separately for the pooled sample
(Panel A), small block grant schools (Panel B) and large block grant schools (Panel C). Two items
are of note here. First, among small block grant schools, students in schools where administrators
had anemia and test incentives report receiving more of these nutrition related inputs overall
compared to no incentive schools based on the summary index (Column 7). Second, consistent
with the budget allocations above, students in test incentive schools are significantly less likely to
report receiving supplements or meat at home compared to anemia incentive schools (Columns 2
and 5). Instead, the overall gain in inputs in test incentive schools appears to come from relatively
more feeding at school. Again, it appears that - even though changes in hemoglobin concentration
were similar across anemia and test incentive schools - administrators in these schools used grants
to invest more broadly in nutrition instead of more focused iron delivery approaches.
Turning to education inputs in Table 6.24, I find little evidence of any positive e↵ect due
to either incentive. In fact, if anything, the point estimates indicate that the anemia incentive
had a negative e↵ect on these intermediate outcomes. In the pooled sample and small block grant
group estimates, anemia incentives appear to have significantly increased the student reports of
teacher absenteeism. These results are consistent with those found for impacts on standardized
exam scores and provide further evidence for a reallocation away from education inputs due to the
anemia incentive. It is worth noting, however, that there is little evidence of a negative e↵ect due
to test incentives.
As mentioned above, incentives could also lead to a reallocation of inputs across children.
I test this hypothesis in Tables 6.25 and 6.26. Table 6.25 estimates treatment e↵ects on sum-
mary indices for anemia (odd columns) and education (even columns) inputs for each quintile of




























(1) (2) (3) (4)   
0.022 0.277 0.197 -0.369* 0.233 -0.174 0.041
(0.045) (0.215) (0.223) (0.193) (0.202) (0.272) (0.033)
0.041 0.204 0.301* -0.004 0.021 -0.369 0.059*
(0.043) (0.199) (0.166) (0.212) (0.196) (0.280) (0.032)
0.008 -0.065 -0.176 0.474* 0.105 0.683* -0.006
(0.055) (0.285) (0.235) (0.270) (0.270) (0.383) (0.043)
4. Observations 16865 17011 18120 18120 18120 18120 18120
5. R-squared 0.340 0.314 0.304 0.181 0.111 0.104 0.167
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.640 0.710 0.530 0.060* 0.280 0.480 0.570
7. Dual Incentive 0.070 0.420** 0.320 0.100 0.360** 0.140 0.090***
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.110 0.040 0.110 0.640 0.060 0.620 0.000
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 0.870 2.710 1.040 1.250 4.090 7.550 -0.030
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
0.172** 0.749** 0.333* -0.005 0.476** -0.020 0.113**
(0.069) (0.302) (0.193) (0.209) (0.214) (0.341) (0.050)
0.110 0.193 0.476*** 0.241 0.009 -0.498 0.121***
(0.077) (0.311) (0.158) (0.230) (0.230) (0.363) (0.046)
-0.068 -0.421 -0.409* 0.272 0.073 0.642 -0.074
(0.092) (0.413) (0.236) (0.299) (0.335) (0.533) (0.064)
4. Observations 8557 8638 9132 9132 9132 9132 9132
5. R-squared 0.395 0.432 0.390 0.188 0.122 0.117 0.217
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.260 0.040** 0.430 0.150 0.040** 0.180 0.870
7. Dual Incentive 0.210*** 0.520 0.400** 0.510** 0.560** 0.120 0.160***
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.000 0.100 0.010 0.030 0.010 0.740 0.000
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 0.800 2.560 0.850 1.000 3.880 7.280 -0.110
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
-0.085* -0.155 -0.198 -0.565** 0.080 -0.613* -0.037
(0.050) (0.285) (0.277) (0.240) (0.327) (0.342) (0.035)
-0.078 -0.257 0.046 -0.056 0.117 -0.167 0.000
(0.047) (0.229) (0.239) (0.283) (0.303) (0.399) (0.039)
0.123* 0.466 0.275 0.292 -0.018 0.713 0.030
(0.071) (0.381) (0.292) (0.337) (0.397) (0.505) (0.050)
4. Observations 8308 8373 8988 8988 8988 8988 8988
5. R-squared 0.557 0.453 0.294 0.248 0.125 0.112 0.257
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.890 0.700 0.290 0.080* 0.900 0.250 0.310
7. Dual Incentive -0.040 0.050 0.120 -0.330 0.180 -0.070 -0.010
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.320 0.810 0.700 0.260 0.570 0.870 0.860
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 0.940 2.870 1.240 1.500 4.300 7.820 0.050
3. (Anemia)X(Test)
NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown for treatment group dummy variables and interactions obtained by
estimating equation (5.4)  (controling for baseline hemoglobin concentration, student age, student grade, student sex, number of students in the school, whether
the school has a canteen, student teacher ratio, distance to the furthest village served, percent of boarding students, whether the school has implemented the
”Free Lunch” policy, county dummy variables, and dummy variables for randomization strata).   A child is considered anemic if they have an altitude-adjusted




Panel C: Large Block Grant
1. Anemia Incentive
2. Test Incentive




Panel B: Small Block Grant
























(1) (2) (3) (4)   
-0.011 0.574** 0.021 -0.075 -0.260 -0.370* -0.053*
(0.012) (0.260) (0.045) (0.215) (0.252) (0.210) (0.027)
-0.008 0.155 -0.057 0.124 0.286 0.238 0.020
(0.013) (0.231) (0.045) (0.217) (0.258) (0.215) (0.027)
0.015 -0.613* 0.067 -0.185 -0.183 0.115 0.015
(0.017) (0.348) (0.068) (0.311) (0.347) (0.296) (0.040)
4. Observations 18096 17002 17000 16816 16974 16797 18120
5. R-squared 0.047 0.083 0.127 0.228 0.197 0.208 0.159
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.820 0.090* 0.100 0.360 0.020** 0.010** 0.010**
7. Dual Incentive 0.000 0.120 0.030 -0.140 -0.160 -0.020 -0.020
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.730 0.620 0.540 0.510 0.580 0.940 0.520
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 0.180 1.600 0.680 8.270 7.190 5.060 0.020
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
0.003 0.876** -0.072 -0.014 -0.180 -0.242 -0.059
(0.017) (0.436) (0.068) (0.331) (0.375) (0.293) (0.037)
-0.008 0.156 -0.112 0.339 0.421 0.636** 0.051
(0.014) (0.317) (0.081) (0.351) (0.386) (0.288) (0.035)
0.005 -0.549 0.291** -0.242 -0.465 -0.281 -0.037
(0.025) (0.483) (0.118) (0.439) (0.492) (0.382) (0.050)
4. Observations 9119 8612 8615 8509 8588 8499 9132
5. R-squared 0.042 0.127 0.156 0.272 0.237 0.210 0.199
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.490 0.100 0.610 0.240 0.050* 0.000*** 0.000***
7. Dual Incentive 0.000 0.480 0.110 0.080 -0.220 0.110 -0.040
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.980 0.130 0.130 0.800 0.590 0.700 0.170
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 0.150 1.490 0.710 7.910 6.590 4.480 0.000
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
-0.038** 0.342 0.034 0.223 -0.017 -0.050 -0.004
(0.016) (0.355) (0.057) (0.285) (0.335) (0.247) (0.039)
-0.023 -0.037 -0.058 -0.036 0.575* 0.484* 0.042
(0.016) (0.370) (0.056) (0.255) (0.298) (0.273) (0.039)
0.028 -0.583 -0.061 -0.187 -0.225 -0.128 0.024
(0.025) (0.504) (0.083) (0.443) (0.474) (0.340) (0.057)
4. Observations 8977 8390 8385 8307 8386 8298 8988
5. R-squared 0.064 0.123 0.126 0.283 0.215 0.238 0.188
6. p-Value [H0:Anemia = Test] 0.420 0.270 0.070* 0.330 0.050* 0.060* 0.210
7. Dual Incentive -0.03* -0.280 -0.090 0.000 0.330 0.310 0.060
8. p-Value  [H0:Dual = 0] 0.050 0.510 0.170 1.000 0.330 0.280 0.150
9. Control Group (No Incentive) Mean 0.210 1.720 0.650 8.650 7.830 5.680 0.050
3. (Anemia)X(Test)




NOTES. Data source: authors’ survey. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) shown for treatment group dummy variables and interactions
obtained by estimating equation (5.4)  (controling for baseline hemoglobin concentration, student age, student grade, student sex, number of students in
the school, whether the school has a canteen, student teacher ratio, distance to the furthest village served, percent of boarding students, whether the
school has implemented the ”Free Lunch” policy, county dummy variables, and dummy variables for randomization strata).   A child is considered
anemic if they have an altitude-adjusted hemoglobin concentration below 120 g/L (per WHO guidelines, WHO 2001).  *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.




Panel A: Full Sample (Small and Large Block Grant)
1. Anemia Incentive
2. Test Incentive
Table 6.24: E↵ects of Anemia and Test Incentives on Education Inputs
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distribution of exam scores.
Table 6.25 shows that students in higher quintiles of the baseline hemoglobin distribution
report receiving significantly more nutrition inputs due to anemia incentives in small block grant
schools. That students in lower quintiles are comparatively less likely to report receiving signifi-
cantly more inputs implies that there was little target by administrators based on baseline anemia
status. A higher level of inputs in upper quintiles due to anemia incentives could also be due to
heterogeneity in how households responded to nutritional information received from schools. The
table also shows evidence clear evidence of a multitasking e↵ect: students at upper quintiles in
anemia incentive schools report receiving significantly less in terms of educational inputs. There
is no significant di↵erence in educational inputs for the for the bottom quintile, however. Lack of
a positive e↵ect for this group suggests that the reduction in inputs for upper quintiles reflects an
overall redistribution from education to nutritional inputs rather than a redistribution to students
initially anemic. That there is not a significant reduction also implies that this overall reduction
in inputs was o↵set (likely by improved health fi healthier students attract more inputs, teacher
attantion for example ).
Another interesting result in this table is that test incentives increased student-reported
receipt of anemia inputs (comparably to the e↵ect of anemia incentives) and also led to increases
in education inputs for the upper quintiles. Panel A, Row 6 shows that the e↵ects of anemia
incentives and test incentives were significantly di↵erent for quintiles 2-5. This increase in inputs
did not lead to improved exam performance, however (Table 6.18).
Heterogeneous e↵ects on reported input receipt along the baseline exam score distribution is
shown in Table 6.26. The e↵ect of anemia incentives on anemia inputs in small block grant schools
is similar across the quintiles (Panel A, Row 1, even columns). This is what one would expect
since there is no reason to believe administrators would target anemia inputs in this dimension
due to anemia incentives. Consistent with the results for impacts on exam scores, the negative
e↵ects of anemia incentives on education inputs are larger in the upper quintiles of the exam score
distribution. A final observation worth noting is that the (negative) e↵ect of the anemia incentive
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on education inputs and the (positive) e↵ect of test incentives on education inputs are statistically














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusion
While performance incentives for front-line workers in public service organizations can be
useful in increasing e↵ort provision, incentives for managers have greater capacity to also influence
the allocation of organizational resources within a manager’s decision-making authority. In this
dissertation, I study the role of managerial incentives in service delivery by analyzing a large-
scale policy experiment in rural China designed to test how incentives for school administrators
and increased resources under their control a↵ect the implementation of a school-based nutrition
program targeting iron deficiency anemia.
Through this experiment, I study three main questions. First, I study the impact of ad-
ministrator incentives tied to student nutrition, rewarding administrators based on school level
changes in the rate of anemic students over the school year. I find that incentives for school ad-
ministrators tied to anemia reductions were e↵ective when administrators had a smaller amount
of resources with which to implement the program. O↵ering administrators incentives that paid
125 yuan ( 19.84) per anemia case averted (realized payouts were equivalent to approximately 2
months’ salary on average) reduced endline anemia rates among students anemic at baseline by
12.5 percentage points (or 34%). Evidence on mechanisms suggests that, absent more program
resources, larger incentives led principals to urge caregivers at home to improve the diets of stu-
dents. This result suggests that incentives for providers tied to outcomes that are jointly produced
with beneficiaries can encourage them to influence beneficiaries in order to improve the contracted
outcome.
I do not, however, find that small performance incentives, 10% of the strength, were e↵ective
(and were significantly less e↵ective than larger incentives). Previous studies from a variety of
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contexts have shown small incentives or prices leading to large changes in behavior (Kremer &
Miguel 2007; Thornton 2008; Banerjee et al. 2010; Cohen & Dupas 2010; Karlan et al. 2011; Duflo
et al. 2011). The findings in these studies suggest that the existence of incentives or a price may
be more important than the actual level of incentives. My results, however, are more in line with
traditional theory that the strength (or price e↵ect) of incentives is important. A key di↵erence
could be that, compared to one-o↵ decisions such as purchasing a good, individuals may be more
willing to calculate expected payo↵s when rewards are based on sustained actions (such as in an
employment setting). Another key di↵erence is that information on anemia was provided to all
school administrators and hence the incentives did not raise the salience of anemia relative to the
comparison group.
Second, I study the e↵ect of increasing the amount of resources available to school ad-
ministrators to implement an anemia reduction program and how the responses of managers to
performance incentives vary with the amount of resources under their control. I find that—even
absent explicit incentives to reduce anemia—increasing the amount of resources earmarked for the
program under control of school administrators led to sizable reductions. Increasing the size of the
block grant from 0.3 yuan ( 0.05) per child per day (approximately 7,452 yuan, or 1,183, total
on average) to 0.7 yuan per child per day ( 0.11—approximately 17,388 yuan or 2,760 total, on
average) reduced anemia rates among those initially anemic by 19 percentage points (or 53%).
Further, I find that the impact of additional resources on student nutrition does not appear to be
due to an increase in resources alone. Increasing grant amounts also led to a more e cient use
of resources and encouraged schools to engage with households to improve student diets at home.
This finding lends support to the motivational e↵ects of additional autonomy heavily emphasized
in the public administration literature (Rose-Ackerman 1986; Perry & Wise 1990). This may also
reflect an ’obligation’ e↵ect whereby administrators felt an obligation to implement programs ef-
fectively precisely because they received a significant amount of resources. Although increasing
program resources had the largest impact on anemia (in terms of point estimates), increasing re-
sources was twice as expensive (per anemia case averted) as adding large performance incentives
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to the smaller block grant.
Increasing the amount of resources available to school administrators was much less e↵ective
when they were also given (large) incentives. In other words, I find that managerial incentives and
resources under managerial control are substitutes in this context. I find this substiuttion e↵ect
not only in results for student nutrition, but also in nutritional inputs (such as iron-containing
supplements, iron-rich and iron absorption enhancing foods and nutritional information to children
and households) provided by schools. One explanation for substitution is that increasing resources
negated the e↵ect that anemia-based incentives had in motivating administrators to mobilize extra-
marginal resources (e.g. engage households). This cannot be the sole explanation, however, given
the degree of substitution found: in the presence of a large grant, incentives have a slight negative
e↵ect on nutrition outcomes. I therefore explore a number of alternative explanations to the extent
possible.
Evidence suggests that this ’crowding-out’ e↵ect of incentives is unlikely to be due to the
way that incentives and budget size convey information about task di culty (Benabou & Tirole
2003). It is also unlikely to be due to incentives or resources displacing pure intrinsic motivation
(such as a sense of organizational mission—Frey & Jegen 2001; Francois & Vlassopoulos 2008;
Gneezy et al. 2011; Kamenica 2012). I find strongest empirical support for a mechanism whereby
incentive contracts re-frame the task of implementing the nutrition programs from one that was
part of the professional role of administrators to one that was not, in line with the general insights
of Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Heyman and Ariely (2004). Shifting the frame of the activity
from one that was professional and part of administrators role as members of an organization
(the educational bureaucracy) could have two e↵ects. First, it could have negated any ’obligation’
that administrators felt to e↵ectively implement programs due to increased resources. With an
incentive structures as personal income, administrators could ’pay’ to avoid the obligation in
foregone rewards. Second, it may have increased (or administrators perceived them as increasing)
perceptions of their liability for potentially negative outcomes (the risk of food poisoning, for
example). Because smaller budgets, in practice, kept administrators from being able to a↵ord food
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and other inputs beyond iron supplements (which were perceived as safe and were not procured by
principals themselves) incentives were e↵ective in this case through e↵ort to enforce “compliance”
with a supplement regimen. With a larger budget and incentive, risk-averse and career-concerned
school administrators facing ‘bureaucratic incentives’ were reluctant to devote e↵ort or resources to
the nutrition program. This result is in conflict with the general view that incentives and autonomy
should be complementary as autonomy provides more flexibility to respond to incentives. More
generally, this crowding-out result suggests that incentives could alter how tasks or outcomes are
attributed to managers being incentivized. Future research should directly test how incentives are
interpreted and the consequences of this in an organizational context.
The third main question I study is how provider (school administrator) incentives to re-
duce anemia and improve test scores each a↵ect anemia prevalence and academic performance.
Although the theory of multitasking (following from the work of Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991)
is well developed, there are few empirical studies testing this theory directly. The context of
school-based nutrition programs allows me to simultaneously test how incentives for a given ’di-
rection’ of e↵ort a↵ect outcomes that are more or less well-aligned. Because student nutrition
is an input into education production but academic performance is not an input into nutritional
production, test incentives are well-aligned with improving nutrition but anemia-based incentives
are not well aligned with e↵ort to purely increase academic performance. I also test the e↵ect
of rewarding multiple outcomes simultaneously and asses the potential for multiple rewards to
lessen distortionary e↵ects due to multitasking. I emphasize three main findings. First, incen-
tives in the two dimensions (given in the context of an anemia reduction program) both led to
significant reductions in anemia prevalence. Second, anemia-based and test-based incentives serve
as substitutes in the direction of anemia reduction: providing administrators with both types of
incentives did not lead to significantly larger reductions in anemia. Third, I find that anemia
incentives caused an allocation of resources away from education ’inputs’ but this did not lead to
significantly lower student performance on standardized exams after one year. Less reallocation
occurred when administrators had test based incentives or both types of incentives. Collectively,
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these results confirm theoretical predictions and reflect that test-based incentives are well-aligned
with improving nutrition, but anemia-based incentives are not well aligned with e↵ort to improve
academic performance. Strengthening incentives to improve academic performance while also em-
phasizing the relationship between good nutrition and academic performance may therefore be
su cient to motivate administrators to e↵ectively implement school-based anemia reduction pro-
grams while causing less reallocation of resources away from education. The result that rewarding
multiple dimensions simultaneously was not additionally beneficial also has implications for the
design of performance incentive schemes that use multiple measures in reward determination (as
is common in health applications). Rewarding additional measures that are jointly produced may
not lead to additional increases in contracted outcomes.
A number of caveats should be considered along with the results presented here. First,
there are presumably more optimal contract structures than the ones used. The contracts used
were chosen for their simplicity and transparency. Optimal contract design also requires more
information than is typically available (information on risk aversion, for example). At the same
time, it is unclear if more complex contracts can produce better outcomes. Any potential gains
from more optimal contracts may be o↵set by responses to complexity or lack of transparency.
This is an important area for future research.
Second, I only study e↵ects of incentives over the course of one school year. How e↵ects
evolve over time, however, could be critical. Although ratchet-type e↵ects are unlikely given a lin-
ear contract, the motivational e↵ects of outcome-based contracts could degrade over time due to
variability in outcome measures that is uncorrelated with e↵ort. This could happen, for instance,
if providers who invest significant e↵ort are not rewarded due to downside shocks in the outcome
measure. Similarly, providers who chose not to allocate substantial e↵ort may nevertheless be
rewarded substantially due to upside shocks. In either instance, e↵ort could decline in subsequent
periods. Future research should investigate this issue directly, including the comparison of rewards
tied to less-variable “input” measures and outcome-based incentives over time. While input incen-
tives may not be as closely related to the outcomes ultimately valued and do not create incentives
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for innovation, this may be compensated by better reflection of provider e↵ort.
Finally, as with any empirical study, my results are only internally valid and may vary in
other settings, particularly settings with significantly di↵erent incentive systems. Future research
should examine managerial incentives and their potential to improve service delivery in other
geographical and institutional contexts.
Regardless of these caveats, the results presented here o↵er insights into the design of in-
centives in public service organizations. Overall, results suggest that performance incentives for
managers may hold promise for improving service delivery in developing countries; however, policy
makers designing performance incentive schemes should consider carefully institutional features
and existing incentives embedded within public service organizations.
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Chapter A: Intervention Materials
A.1 Training Materials
A.1.1 Anemia Information Video Script Translation
Hello! My name is Dr. Wang and today I’m going to talk to you about something called
anemia. Did you know that around 40% of children in rural areas of China are anemic? This
is a problem for principals like yourself because anemic children do worse in school than healthy
children!
So, what is anemia? Anemia is a disease that makes it di cult for the oxygen you breathe
in to get to your muscles and brain. Without oxygen in your brain, you are unable to think clearly.
So how do we fix this? Well, by eating lots of iron-rich foods! Foods like meat, beans and tofu will
help turn a sickly, anemic person into a stronger, smarter healthy person!
How can you tell if any students in your school are anemic?
One of the most troublesome things about anemia is that there are often no symptoms.
A healthy looking child may still be anemic! At times, there may be signs that children are
anemic. Anemic children sometimes get headaches and complain about being dizzy. Anemic
children sometimes feel chronically tired. They might be pale. Anemic students may have a hard
time paying attention in class. Many anemic children end up skinner and shorter than they should
be. BUT SOME DO NOT. Again: there may be children that do not have any of these symptoms,
but who still have anemia. And, when students have anemia, this puts them at a disadvantage
compared to their healthier classmates.
In fact, researchers have studied anemia and its e↵ect on grades in Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu
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and Qinghai. In ALL of the studies, it was found that children with anemia perform worse than
their classmates in school. They get worse grades, and perform worse on standardized intelligence
tests. When anemic students are treated for anemia, their grades in school have been shown to
increase by up to five points! This is the di↵erence between a C+ (75 points out of a 100) and a
B (80 points or more)!
There is some Good News, however. All of these problems can be easily fixed, just by
treating anemia in your school.
Researchers have found that around one-third of children in your area have anemia. If you
suspect that some students in your school might be anemic, don’t worry—anemia is easy to treat!
To fight and prevent anemia—and improve student performance in class—you can just make a
few simple changes in your students’ diet to make sure they are getting enough iron and eating a
balanced diet.
What foods have iron? MEAT. Chicken, beef, lamb and pork—all animal meats are great
sources of iron. Eggs and milk are healthy foods, but they don’t have any iron!
Some other foods have iron too, but it is harder for children to absorb iron from non-meat
sources. Meat is the best source of iron. Other sources of iron are pumpkin or squash seeds, potato
skins, tofu and soy products, peanuts, and beans. If you want to add these foods to your students’
diet, make sure you also add lots of fruits and vegetables so that the children can absorb the iron
into their bodies. Vegetables like green peppers, chili peppers, and red dates are all good sources
of vitamin C, which children need to absorb iron. Did you know that adding a red date or other
source of vitamin C to your students’ meal can boost their rate of iron absorption by as much as
300%?
Eating a balanced diet each day is important for overcoming anemia, so feed your child lots
of meat and vegetables in addition to staples like plain rice, noodles, and buns. Eating staples
may make children feel full, but they don’t contain any iron and have few other nutrients, so by
themselves they are not healthy. Staples should be paired with meat or vegetables to make a
healthy meal.
114
Remember, adding ONLY more fruits and vegetables to your students’ meals is good, but
not enough.
Adding ONLY more grains to your students’ meals is good, but not enough.
A balance of meat, fruits and vegetables is key to keeping students in your school healthy
and ready to learn!
Exactly how much meat does a child need to eat to stay healthy? He should eat half a jin
of meat each day. How much is that? Make a fist with your hand. Every day your students should
eat about two fists of meat. More specifically, each student could eat: 12 jin of pork (two and a
half fists) 1/3 jin of chicken (one and a half fists) 34 jin of lamb (four fists) 4/5 jin of tofu
(two fists) 4/3 jin of beans (one bowl)
Keep in mind that this is how much iron a child should consume in a full day, not just in
a single meal. Since many children eat meals at both home and school, you may have to share
the responsibility for child nutrition with students’ parents. You can talk to them about student
nutrition and the importance of a balanced meal.
Even if you can’t provide students with as much meat as they need, remember that some
meat is better than none at all!
Now let’s make some healthy meal combinations! Here are some examples of a healthy
school lunch:
Chicken and green pepper Pork and chopped cabbage Tofu and chili peppers String
beans with ground pork
In addition to supplementing school meals with meat, vegetables and fruit, there are other
things you can do to reduce anemia in your schools. Some of these options might be cheaper or
easier than buying meat everyday, and can be just as e↵ective!
One option is to give students a daily multivitamin with iron. A single vitamin tablet has
as much iron as a whole dish of pork! Vitamins are easy to dispense – other principals in your
area have tried it and found that students in their schools became more energetic and performed
better in school. A daily multivitamin helps prevent anemia and especially helps children who
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are already anemic and most at-risk for learning problems. Follow the recommended dosages for
children on the bottle, and be sure to provide clean drinking water for students to use when taking
vitamins. Many manufacturers now make chewable vitamins for children. These are easy to take,
don’t require any water, and kids often enjoy the taste!
Vitamins may not be readily available at your local grocery store, but we can help you
purchase them easily.
Another way to reduce anemia in your school is to cook school meals with foods that are
fortified with iron. Some special types of soy sauce and flour have extra iron added. These are
cheap, and taste the same as regular soy sauce and flour. Fortified foods are often di cult to find
at your local grocery store, but we can help you purchase them easily.
You may also choose to tell parents about anemia and why it is important. Tell them that
their children might not be doing as well in school as they should be, and share the strategies
you have learned to reduce anemia. Explain the importance of a balanced diet. Persistent e↵orts
from teachers and principals to talk to parents is very important, and there are many successful
examples of this. Most parents are very concerned about the well-being of their children. However,
it is not an easy task to convey key nutrition and health information to parents! Giving parents
pamphlets or letters about anemia and how to prevent anemia is not always e↵ective. Some parents
may not receive the information, some may not understand it, and some may think they do not
have the economic means to change their dietary habits.
Instead, try holding meetings at school with parents to communicate information directly.
Frequently follow up to check in about progress and to answer any questions parents might have.
Remember that the best strategy for reducing anemia will depend on local conditions at
your school—and no one knows your school better than you do! Can you think of other ways to
reduce anemia in your school? Be creative! You know your school and students best, so you may
be able to think of even better strategies for keeping your students healthy.
Why is it so important to address the anemia problem in your school?
Well, researchers in Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai found that anemic children who
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took a daily multivitamin with iron saw a big improvement in their test scores. This was because
as their anemia was treated, they grew stronger, could think more clearly, and got better grades.
Eating meat does the same thing!
Whichever option you choose, remember that it is your responsibility to make sure your
students are eating healthily everyday. They will grow taller, think more clearly, and get better
grades so that they can go on to high school and college. Help give China’s children a better
future!
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A.1.2 Example Budget Plan
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Agreement between the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute for
Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources and Concerning
School Administrator Rewards to Reduce Anemia and Raise Academic
Performance
Party A: Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute for Geographic Sciences and Natural Re-
sources
Party B: (School Administrator)
We are happy to inform you that you have been selected to participate in a project to
prevent anemia and raise academic achievement among students in Western China’s impoverished
areas. As part of this project, Party A o↵ers Party B a performance bonus based on Party
B’s ability to reduce the number of anemic students in their school and, independently, to raise
students’ academic achievement. These rewards are being o↵ered to you by the Center for Chinese
Agricultural Policy at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CCAP), who is managing the project on
behalf of project sponsors. This reward will be paid within 2 weeks after the completion of the
project. The details of bonus calculations based on reducing the number of anemic students and
raising are as follows:
Anemia Reward
In September of 2011, Party A conducted a baseline survey in the school of Party B. As part
of this survey, Party A collected information on the anemia status of your students and found that
students were anemic. In the Spring of 2012, Party A will return to the school of Party B to
once again asses students for anemia. If in Spring 2012 the number of students with anemia has
declined compared to the number of students found in September 2011and Party B remains as the
school’s principal at that time, Party A will provide Party B with a reward. For every 10 student
decrease in the number of students with anemia, Party A will pay Party B 1,250 RMB (125 RMB
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per student). If the number of anemic students increases, Party A will not pay a reward to Party
B.
Academic Performance Reward
In September of 2011, Party A conducted a baseline survey in the school of Party B. As
part of this survey, Party A administered standardized exams in math and Chinese language based
on the national curriculum to students in the school of Party B and found an average combined
score of . In the Spring of 2012, Party A will return to the school of Party B to once again
administer standardized exams in math and Chinese. If in Spring 2012, the average combined
score of students has increased compared to the average combined score found in September 2011
and Party B remains as the principal at that time, Party A will provide Party B with a reward.
For every 1 point increase in the combined average score of the students in the school of Party B,
Party A will pay Party B 800 RMB. If the combined average score decreases, Party A will not pay
a reward to Party B.
Please contact the following if you have questions:
Phone XXX-XXXXXXXX (Contact Person: )
Email: XXXXXX@XXXX.com.cn
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